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Abstract 
 
 While the efficacy of cash transfer (CT) programs worldwide has been well-researched, 
the administrative operations of those same programs are often overlooked. This thesis focuses 
on the most contentious operational feature of cash transfers: conditionality. Policymakers 
traditionally categorize CT programs as “conditional” or “unconditional,” a false binary that 
ignores the nuances of such programs. Existing literature has pointed out that conditionality is 
not binary, but this thesis goes further and develops a novel “normative spectrum of 
conditionality.” This spectrum is derived through exploring the conceptual links between 
conditionality and the ethical notion of paternalism. The spectrum includes a new category 
suggested by this thesis, “perceived conditionality.” The existence of perceived conditionality is 
then analyzed in nominally unconditional CT programs (UCTs) in Malawi, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe, using a quantitative and normative mixed-methods approach. Using data from the 
Transfer Project, this thesis links “rules” (education, clothing, food, and investment) perceived 
by program recipients to outcome categories. Using a difference-in-differences (DID) model and 
marginal propensity to consume (MPC) analysis, this thesis estimates the impact of rule 
perception on household expenditure. Overall, perception of a given rule had no effect on 
behavior in any country, with a few minor exceptions that lack practical significance. However, 
in all three countries, the types of households that perceived rules tended to be larger, have more 
children, and have a younger household head. The thesis concludes with a normative analysis, 
which considers each of the three cash transfer programs as a “case study” to which the 
normative spectrum of conditionality can be applied. Overall, it is concluded that although the 
programs contain elements of paternalism, those elements are morally permissible. 
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Chapter One: Introduction, Key Questions, and Significance 
 
Recent history of social assistance in the developing world 
 
 The turn of the 21st century marked a new era in social protection policy around the 
globe. Social protection policies and programs are designed to reduce poverty and vulnerability 
through capacity-building, risk management, and the promotion of efficient labor markets. 
Financial crises and austerity regimes in Latin America (LAC) in the 1980s created a political 
climate conducive to the rise of social protection policies needed to combat increasing inequity 
and vulnerability. These policies included cash transfer (CT) programs, which provide direct 
cash assistance to targeted populations. Social protection in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) shifted in 
the early 2000s, from primarily emergency aid to regular, cash-based assistance. The change 
represented efforts to alleviate poverty in the long run, as well as providing short-term relief 
(Scarlato & d’Agostino, 2016). Following the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, social safety 
nets, such as cash transfer programs, for the extreme poor have become increasingly popular 
policy options in many developing countries (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). In 2015, the World 
Bank reported that every country in the world had at least one social safety net program, with CT 
programs as one of the most prevalent types of social safety nets (Honorati, Gentilini, & 
Yemtsov, 2015: 7). As of 2015, 130 countries had a type of CT program called an unconditional 
cash transfer (UCT), and 94 had another type of CT program, a conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
(Honorati et al., 2015:7). There has been particularly rapid growth of UCTs in SSA, where 21 
countries had UCTs in 2010 and just four years later, the number had nearly doubled (Honorati 
et al., 2015:7).  
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Cash transfers and conditionality  
 
Cash transfer programs (CT) comprise one type of social protection policy especially 
popular in LAC and SSA. These programs provide direct cash to targeted populations, such as 
low-income or otherwise vulnerable households, and can reduce poverty by allowing recipients 
to “smooth their consumption,” or anticipate and plan for periods of lower income by saving 
during the high-income periods (Anderson et al., 2017). Cash transfers can also help 
beneficiaries to protect against shocks, avoid debt, and invest in income-generating activities 
(IGA), education, and healthcare (Anderson et al., 2017). As policymakers and development 
economists have implemented and examined CT programs in recent years, they have found them 
to be effective in alleviating poverty, or aspects of it (Anderson et al., 2017; Scarlato & 
d’Agostino, 2016). Across SSA, cash transfers led to increased household consumption, often 
reducing poverty and improving health and nutrition outcomes at the household level (Bhalla, 
Handa, Angeles, & Seidenfeld, 2018; Brugh, Angeles, Mvula, Tsoka, & Handa, 2018; Hidrobo, 
Hoddinott, Kumar, & Olivier, 2018; Tiwari et al., 2016).  
Cash transfers are not just spent on consumer goods, but often invested, increasing 
overall agricultural productivity and education levels of beneficiary households (Asfaw, Davis, 
Dewbre, Handa, & Winters, 2014; Baird, Ferreira, Ozler, & Woolcock, 2013; Boone, 
Covarrubias, Davis, & Winters, 2013; Covarrubias, Davis, & Winters, 2012; Diadone, Davis, 
Handa, & Winters, 2017; Hidrobo et al., 2018; Prifti, Daidone, & Grinspun, 2018). Some 
programs, such as the Child Grant Programme in Zambia, have had strong multiplier effects on 
the local economy (Handa, Natali, Seidenfeld, Tembo, & Davis, 2018). Certain CT programs in 
Brazil, Chile, and Malawi were so successful that they were scaled to a national level (Cecchini 
& Martínez, 2012; Scarlato & d’Agostino, 2016). 
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Since the early 2000s, a persisting debate about cash transfers has been whether, or to 
what extent, they should be conditioned. While all programs have eligibility requirements to 
assess level of need (based on financial and/or demographic factors), some additionally require 
beneficiaries to comply with certain rules, or conditions, to receive funds. These programs are 
generally referred to as conditional cash transfers (CCT), and the conditions are designed to 
promote the development of human capital, usually in the form of education or health (Anderson 
et al., 2017). Programs that do not explicitly require beneficiaries to follow rules in order to 
receive the cash are called unconditional cash transfers (UCT). Both CCTs and UCTs can lead to 
behavioral change, but only CCTs require it (Anderson et al., 2017). 
While cash assistance to the poor, traditionally in the forms of grants, pensions, subsidies, 
or benefits, is not new, conditioning that assistance is a recent policy development (Pellerano & 
Barca, 2014). In the 1990s, governments in Latin America (LAC) innovated CCTs to address 
inequality and poverty through the promotion of human capital, specifically education and health 
(Pellerano & Barca, 2014). These programs, including Progresa in Mexico, Bolsa Familia in 
Brazil, and Chile Solidario in Chile, were largely successful in their objectives to reduce poverty 
and improve human capital in the realm of health and education, and they helped to spark a 
policy movement toward cash transfer programs. In 1997, only two countries worldwide had a 
CCT program; in 2008, 27 countries did (Bastagli et al., 2016). As of 2016, Bastagli et al. report 
that 130 low- and middle-income countries had at least one form of a UCT program, and 63 
countries had at least one CCT program. In sub-Saharan Africa specifically, 40 of 48 countries 
had a UCT in 2016, representing a 50% increase since 2010. Generally, CCTs are more popular 
in the LAC context, whereas UCTs are more common in SSA (Scarlato & d’Agostino, 2016).  
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In the past few decades, as CT programs have grown in popularity worldwide, there has 
been much debate over whether UCTs or CCTs are more effective at reducing poverty at the 
household and community levels. But a “conditional versus unconditional” debate implies a false 
binary (Baird et. al, 2013). Conditionality is far more complicated and operates on a spectrum. 
This thesis both explores and challenges that spectrum of conditionality. In practice, most 
programs are not purely “UCTs” or “CCTs,” although they may be labeled as such (Pellerano & 
Barca, 2014).  
 
Types of conditionality 
 
Within both “unconditional” and “conditional” cash transfer programs, variations of 
conditions exist, and scholars distinguish among those variations in a number of ways. This 
section explores some of those distinctions and definitions, with the goal of developing a 
spectrum that ranges from the “strongest” types of conditions to the total absence of conditions. 
Generally, “hard” or “strong” conditionality is considered to be the most intense form. CCTs 
with strong conditionality monitor whether recipients are abiding by a CT program’s rules and 
enforce those rules through penalties (not receiving cash) if necessary (Cecchini & Martínez, 
2012). A hypothetical program that includes conditions that are monitored and enforced 100% of 
the time would operate on the opposite end of the spectrum from a completely unconditional 
program. See Diagram 1.1 below.  
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However, most CT programs operate between these hypothetical ends of the spectrum. 
The language of “conditional” vs. “unconditional,” used by policymakers and researchers alike, 
has created a false binary between UCTs and CCTs. Most of those programs, whether 
conditional or unconditional in name, contain elements of conditionality. Broadly, these elements 
are referred to as “soft” conditionality. Cecchini & Martínez (2012: 95) consider “soft” 
conditions to be those that “reinforce and protect human capital” through monitoring and 
penalties that are not strictly enforced. Similarly, Baird et al. (2013) frame CCTs as operating at 
differing levels of conditionality “intensity.” Levels of intensity correlate to whether, or how 
explicitly, stated conditions are actually monitored and enforced (Baird et al. 2013). Baird et al. 
(2013) considers CCTs that have explicit conditions but are not monitored and enforced to 
operate at a medium level of intensity—which aligns with Cecchini & Martínez’s definition of 
“soft” conditionality. 
Pellerano & Barca (2014: 5-6) give examples of types of soft conditionality. They 




Diagram 1.1: Conditionality binary 
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1. “conditioning on access”—explicit eligibility criteria; 
2. “implicit conditioning” or “conditioning on the means”—design features of the programs 
that sway decision-making, such as payment delivery or gender of recipient; 
3. “indirect conditioning” or “informal conditioning on the rules” or “soft conditionality”—
including the naming of the program and trainings on “best use” of transfers;  
4. “explicit conditionality” or “formal conditionality on the rules” or “hard 
conditionality”—the “additional” requirements of CCTs that make payments contingent 
on certain, explicitly monitored behaviors. 
 
Pellerano & Barca (2014: 6) argue that UCTs can have any or all of the first three types of 
conditioning and still be considered formally unconditional programs. The defining feature of 
CCTs, in their view, is the fourth type of conditionality. According to Pellerano & Barca 
(2014:6), the classic debate between UCTs and CCTs is actually a debate about explicit 
conditionality, since both types of programs share the first three types of implicit conditions. 
They write: 
We argue that the distinction between CCTs and UCTs is largely linked to how the 
contract between provider and recipient is framed. In most cases the difference between 
the two boils down to the fact that in CCTs there is a clear and evident set of ‘desired 
behaviours,’ while in UCTs recipients are generally left with more freedom to spend their 
transfers, so long as they do not abuse them. The current debate on the issue of 
conditionality should therefore be framed differently. The contrast is not between 
conditional and unconditional transfers, but rather between the explicit conditionality of 
CCTs as opposed to ‘traditional’ forms of behavioural conditioning. (Pellerano & Barca, 
2014: 6)  
 
This “soft” category seems to be a degree less conditional than the “labeled cash transfer” 
(LCT) in Morocco, studied by Benhassine, Devoto, Duflo, Dupas, & Pouliquen (2015), which 
was explicitly messaged to be an education program but that didn’t require beneficiaries to enroll 
in or attend school. Usually, when a CT program (whether nominally a UCT or CCT) is 
considered to be “softly conditional,” it is due to messaging put in place by local officials (S. 
Handa, personal interview, March 6, 2020). However, this LCT in Morocco differed in that it 
was the national government that labeled it as an education program. Regardless of the actor 
creating the messaging, both softly conditional CT programs and LCTs maybe be de jure 
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unconditional but de facto conditional. However, this thesis categorizes an LCT as the 
“strongest” type (furthest right on the spectrum) of soft conditionality because a program that is 
called an LCT contains implicit conditionality in its very name, rather than using the 
“unconditional” label. Diagram 1.2 below represents the relative positions of types of conditions.  
 
  
An inconsistent typology of conditionality presents a problem for ongoing research in this 
field and its application to its highly salient policy context. The types of conditions shown on the 
furthest right end of the spectrum, explicit and enforced conditions, may be considered a 
“paternalistic” policy because governmental goals, manifest in the requirements of the 
conditions, are imposed upon the targets of the policy. The study of paternalism in welfare policy 
is a growing field because there are ethical debates surrounding conditions and whether their 
usage is paternalistic and harmfully so. This thesis aims to clarify the types of conditionality and 
then connect them to their ethical implications, applying ethical frameworks developed for other 
types of welfare policies to the case of cash transfers. The ethical literature on paternalism will 
be discussed in Chapter Two, and the application of those frameworks to the CT context will be 
represented visually in a “Normative Spectrum of Conditionality.”  
 
  
Diagram 1.2: Spectrum of conditions 
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Unique contribution of this thesis and policy relevancy 
 This thesis adds to the existing literature on the issue of attaching conditions to cash 
transfers by exploring the possible existence of a different type, perceived conditionality.  
In doing so, this thesis addresses what Benhassine et al. (2015) called a lack of rigorous 
evaluation of perceptions of program rules across cash transfer programs. This thesis examines 
the relationship between beneficiaries’ perceptions of what the received cash is “supposed” to be 
spent on and their actual expenditure decisions. This thesis derives a unique method for 
connecting beneficiaries’ stated perceptions to their spending behaviors, which is explained in 
Chapter Three. The research questions explored in the quantitative analysis are as follows: In 
unconditional cash transfer programs in Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe: 
• Do beneficiaries’ perceptions align with the actual rules of the program? 
• How do beneficiaries’ perceptions of program rules shape their behavior and therefore, 
the impact of the program? 
By focusing on perceptions of “rules” in nominally unconditional CTs, this paper gives 
attention to two understudied areas in the realm of cash transfers, program operations and ethical 
considerations. As with all social assistance programs, effectiveness is not the only aspect that 
matters. To constitute good policy, programs must not only achieve good outcomes, they must be 
administratively well-run. Unfortunately, the administrative (or “operational”) side of CT 
programs is often overlooked. Most program evaluations focus on effectiveness only; some give 
minor analysis of program operations. Only a handful of studies attempt to link operations to 
outcomes. This paper adds to that literature base by exploring the link between perceptions about 
program requirements and the resulting spending decisions of transfer money.  
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Ethical considerations about the design and implementation of CT programs are also 
understudied. This thesis adds to the limited literature on the ethics of conditionality within anti-
poverty policies, specifically cash transfer programs. There are moral implications to requiring 
that the poor meet certain conditions before receiving basic welfare. Yet, in scholarly discussions 
of CT programs, normative analysis has been limited, despite the policy area being a rapidly 
growing one (Pérez-Muñoz, 2017). The focus has been on efficacy alone—do CT programs 
improve the wellbeing of recipients, and what role does conditionality play in that improvement? 
This thesis aims to address the gap between economic and philosophical literature by discussing 
the many dimensions of conditionality. In conjunction with economic theory and empirical 
analysis, this thesis will explore the relationship between paternalism and conditions and the 
objections against various levels of conditionality and apply those ethical frameworks to three 
CT programs in Southern Africa. The normative framework constructed in this chapter and 
applied in Chapter Five paves a new way of analyzing cash transfer programs. This thesis argues 
that to answer the conditionality debate, we must look beyond the relative effectiveness of UCTs 
and CCTs and explore the ethical implications of each type of program. 
This thesis aims to address the lack of attention to program operations and ethics by 
employing a unique, quantitative and ethical, mixed-methods approach to examine the 
administrative side of three UCT programs in Southern Africa. The ethical analysis explores the 
general objections against conditions and then asks the following question: 
• Is there an ethical difference between perceived and hard conditionality and 
therefore a moral reason to favor one over another? 
Moving forward, if CT programs continue to be scaled up in SSA and in particular, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi, a better understanding of their associated conditionality is 
IS PERCEPTION REALITY?   Lundeen  19 
necessary for policy transparency and smooth program operations on the ground. Linking 
recipients’ perceptions of a program to that program’s resulting outcomes is gravely important. 
Depending on the role that messaging, nudges, and perceptions play, implementers of CTs may 
change their tactics significantly—whether to clarify requirements, direct behavioral change, or 
cut administrative costs.  
 
Organization of paper 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter Two provides an overview of the 
literature on cash transfer programs, the conceptual framework for conditionality, and 
perceptions and nudging in social assistance programs. The normative framework will also be set 
up in Chapter Two. Chapter Three discusses the methods and data sources used for the 
quantitative analysis and dives into the specific contexts of each of the three CT programs 
studied. Chapter Four introduces and summarize the quantitative results, and Chapter Five 
provides a related ethical analysis. Chapter Six gives conclusions and policy recommendations 
based on Chapters Four and Five.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review and Conceptual Frameworks 
Literature review 
The traditional conditionality debate: effectiveness of CCTs versus UCTs 
In the wake of the success of the Latin American CCTs, policymakers began to question 
whether the conditions themselves were increasing the impact of the programs (Pellerano & 
Barca, 2014). Most of the literature addressing that question has compared either separate CCT 
and UCT programs, or CCT and UCT arms of the same program. In a meta-review of 201 
studies of 56 CT programs, Bastagli et al. (2016) found only eight studies that directly compared 
a UCT and a CCT. Six of the studies reviewed demonstrated that the CCT had somewhat larger 
impacts on education or health/nutrition-related outcomes than the UCT, or that the CCT had 
impacts where the UCT did not, and four of those six were statistically significant (Bastagli et 
al., 2016).  
Baird, Ferreira, Ozler, & Woolcock (2013) reviewed 35 studies of UCTs versus CCTs by 
comparing their education effects: school enrollment, attendance and test scores. They found that 
compared to no CT program at all, both UCTs and CCTs increase school enrollment—CCTs by 
41% and UCTs by 23%, but that there was no significant difference when directly comparing 
UCTs and CCTs. However, they did find that the intensity of the conditions mattered when 
analyzing the size of a program’s effect on education outcomes. Baird, Ferreira, Ozler, & 
Woolcock (2013) outlined “intensity” as increasing from 1) no conditions, to 2) some conditions 
without monitoring or enforcing, to 3) explicit conditions both monitored and enforced. The first 
two levels of intensity corresponded with an 18-25% increase in the likelihood of school 
enrollment, but the strictest intensity of conditions led to a 60% increase.  
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The scholarly consensus has been that both UCTs and CCTs are effective and sometimes 
one is more effective than the other, depending on the specific objectives and context of the 
program in question. To effectively study the impact of attaching conditions, it is necessary to 
isolate the effect of the conditions from the effect of the transfer itself.  
 
The new conditionality debate: isolated impact of conditions themselves 
 
Some studies aim to isolate the impact of conditions from the program as a whole to 
determine whether conditionality itself has an impact. The results are mixed. Benhassine et al. 
(2015) analyze a unique cash transfer program, Tayssir, in Morocco, that was neither fully 
conditional nor unconditional. The Moroccan government called Tayssir a “labeled cash 
transfer” (LCT) because there were not requirements attached to the cash, but the transfer was 
explicitly called an education support program. The study compares this LCT with a subgroup of 
beneficiaries who received a CCT with education requirements and finds larger impacts of the 
LCT than the CCT on school participation and learning. They conclude that the education label 
itself was strong enough to act as implicit conditionality. The study is limited in that in doesn’t 
consider the beneficiaries’ perceptions of the program’s conditionality.  
Teixeira et al. 2011 find no significant role of the impact of conditionality in the 
Takopora CCTs in Paraguay. Conditions included school attendance, regular healthcare center 
visits, immunizations, and social worker visits, but these conditions were only communicated 
and not monitored (Teixeira et al. 2011: 1). Other studies focus on the heterogeneous impacts of 
conditions: Akresh, De Walque, and Kazianga (2013) conducted an experiment in Burkina Faso 
that compared UCT and CCT arms of the same program. They find that while there were no 
significant differences between the UCT and CCT arms overall, the CCT had larger impacts on 
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“marginal” groups—girls, young children, and children of lower educational ability—than the 
UCT. However, these studies all compare the role of conditions across programs or program 
arms. A more rigorous method would be to statistically separate the impact of a program from 
the impact of its conditions, whether actual or perceived. This statistical separation is based on 




 Traditional economic theory stipulates that all income is fungible, “the notion that money 
has no labels,” as economist Richard Thaler writes (1990: 194). Thaler argues that fungibility is 
the main assumption of the life-cycle theory of savings. This theory stipulates that at a given 
point in time, rational beings make consumption decisions by calculating the present value of 
their wealth and consuming the amount equal to a level annuity that could be purchased with that 
present value of wealth (1990: 193-194). Fungibility is what allows a lifetime value of wealth to 
be “collapsed” into that single number, the level annuity (Thaler, 1990: 194). Theoretically, a 
person’s marginal propensity to consume, or likelihood of spending money, is constant, after 
adjusting for transaction costs (Thaler, 1990: 194). The world in which the fungibility 
assumption always holds and the life-cycle savings theory rings true is a world inhabited by 
“Econs,” those perfectly rational beings decidedly distinct from humans, the sometimes irrational 
beings actually walking the Earth.  
In the CT context, if fungibility holds then households that were likely to spend X% of 
their transfer income on a given budget category at baseline should be just as likely to spend X% 
of the transfer on that budget category at a follow-up evaluation. The marginal propensity to 
consume (MPC) that budget category at baseline would equal the MPC to consume that budget 
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category later. In economic terms, the transfer would exert only an income effect and not a 
substitution effect. If a household experiences an income effect, they will spend more money on 
existing items in their budget without changing the proportion of the budget dedicated to any 
item. A substitution effect would entail the household spending proportionally more or less 
money on an item. In the CT context, if households spend transfer income on given items 
differently over time, then the transfer exerted both income and substitution effects. If those 
budget items relate to beneficiaries’ stated perceptions of “program rules,” such that 
beneficiaries believe the CT program to require them to spend money on those items, then it 
could be determined that the conditions (or perception thereof) themselves are shaping spending 
behavior. The mechanism of behavioral change would be the requirement (or perceived 
requirement) of households to substitute their budgets toward the budget categories stipulated (or 
implied) by the conditions.  
Only a few studies link the impacts of conditions to program effects within a program 
(rather than comparing across programs or program arms). These studies use rigorous 
methodology based on fungibility theory to analyze the income and substitution effects of the 
transfer. Handa, Peterman, Davis, and Stampini (2009) find that households receiving CCT 
benefits from the Prospera (then Progresa) program in Mexico did not spend transfer income 
differently than other income. In other words, income was fungible and the transfer exerted only 
an income effect. They use their results to question the necessity for attaching conditions to CT 
programs if the conditions (in this case, hard conditions) were not achieving what they were 
designed to do: cause a substitution effect toward health and education spending.  
In a program evaluation report on a UCT in Lesotho called the Child Grant Programme, 
Pellerano, Moratti, Jakobsen, Bajgar, and Barca (2014) note the “implicit conditionality” in this 
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program. They find, through both qualitative interviews with beneficiaries and quantitative 
analysis of program impacts, that though the program was called unconditional, “in practice 
respondents receive a very effective messaging that that the cash transfer should be spent on 
children” (Pellerano et al., 2014: v). When recipients received their regular cash payments, they 
also received explicit instructions from social development officers, members of the Village 
Action Committee, or village chiefs that the money was to be spent on children. In turn, this 
messaging led to increased expenditures on education, clothing, and footwear for children. In a 
rigorous study of the same program in Lesotho, Pace, Diadone, Davis, and Pellerano (2016) 
found that the increased expenditures on children’s clothing, education, and school uniforms and 
shoes could be attributed to the explicit messaging surrounding the program; the “soft 
conditionality” caused a behavioral change in beneficiaries’ spending decisions. In this thesis, 
the quantitative analysis in Chapter Four will follow the methodology of Pace et al. (2016) and 
thus add to the small literature base on the casual impact of conditions (whether the conditions 
are actual or perceived). This thesis takes the analysis a step further by exploring the relationship 
between beneficiaries’ perceptions of program rules and their spending behavior by linking their 
stated perceptions to expenditure categories. This method is detailed in Chapter Three.  
 
Construction of normative framework 
Conditionality and paternalism: Ethical objections to hard conditionality 
When policymakers or program administrators attach rules, or conditions, to government 
programs, they are making an ethical decision. By requiring program participants to abide by 
certain rules, these governmental actors are potentially acting paternalistically, which is often 
thought to be morally objectionable. To explore the ethical implications of attaching conditions 
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to cash transfers, it is necessary to understand the philosophical literature surrounding 
paternalism.  
In a couple of recent papers on the ethics of anti-poverty policies, such as basic income 
and cash transfers, philosopher Douglas MacKay outlines definitions of “welfare state 
paternalism” and “parent-targeted paternalism.” MacKay defines welfare state paternalism as the 
following:  
“Welfare State Paternalism (WSP): Government A acts paternalistically towards 
citizen B by implementing welfare policy C if and only if: 
1. C aims to improve B’s good or well-being; 
2. C is implemented without B’s consent; and, 
3. A’s implementation of C is motivated by and/or expresses a negative 
judgment about B’s self-governance or decision-making abilities” (MacKay, 
2019a: 10).  
 
Welfare-state paternalistic policies are thus policies that, without the consent of the policy’s 
target, aim to improve the wellbeing of that (adult) target because the policymaker believes the 
target does not possess sufficient ability to self-govern or make good decisions. For example, the 
Supplemental Nutrition and Assistance Program (SNAP) in the United States (U.S.) limits the 
grocery products that low-income recipients can purchase, seemingly motivated by a negative 
judgment about the ability of the recipient to decide to purchase healthy foods (MacKay 2019a: 
12).  
There are also some welfare policies that aim to improve the wellbeing of the children of 
the policy recipient, through targeting their parents’ decisions. MacKay (2019b) calls this type of 
paternalism “parent-targeted paternalism” (PTP) and explains that there are different normative 
implications to WSP and PTP. MacKay (2019b: 7) defines parent-target paternalism as the 
following: 
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“Parent-Targeted Paternalism: Government A acts paternalistically towards parent B by 
implementing law or policy C if and only if: 
I. C aims to improve the good or wellbeing of B’s children; 
II. C is implemented without B’s consent; and,  
III. A’s implementation of C is motivated by and/or expresses a negative judgment 
about B’s decision-making abilities in the parental sphere.”  
 
Parent-targeted paternalistic policies are thus policies that, without the consent of parents, aim to 
improve the wellbeing of their children because the government or other implementing agency 
considers the policymaker to be more capable of making child-benefitting decisions than the 
parents. To expand upon the SNAP example from WSP, a similar U.S. welfare program that 
aligns with PTP is the Women Infant and Children (WIC) extension of SNAP, which provides 
grocery assistance to pregnant and postpartum women, infants, and children (MacKay 2019b: 3-
8). WIC-eligible foods are restricted to certain products that the government has deemed 
appropriate for recipients with the aim of improving child health, thus expressing a negative 
judgment about mothers’ abilities to choose those foods themselves (MacKay 2019b: 3-8).  
According to MacKay (2019a; 2019b), some paternalistic policies are only morally 
wrong if they target competent adults. Competency involves people’s “capacities to understand 
their world, appreciate the nature of the decisions they must make, engage in practical reasoning, 
and carry out their decisions” (MacKay, 2019a: 13). MacKay considers the “hard” versions of 
both WSP and PTP to be morally wrong to some extent, known as pro tanto wrong. MacKay 
defines “hard” paternalism as targeting competent adults and “soft” paternalism as targeting 
incompetent adults (2019a: 12). Within the WSP framework, MacKay (2019a: 12) discusses 
“competency” as a requirement for the autonomy of agents because WSP commits a complex 
dignitary wrong only against agents who are competent and rational. Within the PTP framework, 
MacKay (2019b: 14-15) states parental competency as the threshold that determines whether the 
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policy is just. The role of competency will be explored further in the Welfare State Paternalism 
and Parent-targeted Paternalism sections of this chapter.  
On MacKay’s view, hard WSP and hard PTP are pro tanto wrong because they commit a 
“complex dignitary wrong” against their targets, treating them as inferior to policymakers in their 
decision-making capacities and as if they were children who were not capable of self-governance 
(2019a: 15). However, as will be explained later, it is possible that PTP is more justifiable than 
WSP, a differentiation that could have implications for the permissibility of paternalistic cash 
transfer programs, if it were possible to cleanly determine whether a program aligns more with 
WSP or PTP.  
One of the reasons it is difficult to determine the ethical permissibility of conditions in 
cash transfer programs is that even CCTs with strong conditionality do not fall neatly within only 
WSP or PTP. Typical programs target recipients at the household level, aiming to improve the 
wellbeing of the household, which may or may not include both parents and children. Some 
programs specify conditions relating to the welfare of children in those households; others do 
not. Even those programs that do stipulate conditions regarding the health or education of 
children do not aim to improve only the welfare of children in the household; the money can still 
be used for purchases that benefit the adults of the household as well as the children, such as 
investing in agricultural productivity or diet diversification.  
The following analysis of the ethical implications of conditions will consider strong 
conditionality only, dubbing strongly conditional cash transfers as “sCCTs” and purely 
unconditional cash transfers (as in, no soft/perceived/implicit conditions present) as “pUCTs.” 
These categories are not actually used in policy, but are useful as ideal types for the purpose of 
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understanding the ethical framework surrounding conditionality. In Chapter Five, the objections 
against hard, or strong, conditionality will be revisited in the context of perceived conditionality.   
 
 
Welfare State Paternalism 
Since all cash transfer programs, regardless of their conditionality, are welfare policies 
intended to increase living standards of target populations, the programs meet the first condition 
for WSP: the policy aims to improve the target’s wellbeing. The second condition required for a 
policy to be considered WSP is a lack of consent by citizens to the policy in question. If citizens 
consent to the welfare policy by voting for it or expressing another form of explicit (not implied) 
consent, then the policy is not paternalistic (MacKay, 2019: 9; 22). One application of this 
principle to the cash transfer context is to imagine that if given the option between a strongly 
conditional cash transfer (sCCT) and a purely unconditional cash transfer (pUCT), citizens 
would prefer the sCCT, thus expressing preference for the potential health/education outcomes 
of the sCCT over the financial independence of the pUCT. In that case, consent would be met, 
and the welfare policy would not be considered paternalistic. Some cash transfer programs are 
motivated by a negative judgement of the recipients’ ability to self-govern or make decisions 
regarding their welfare and therefore meet the third condition for welfare state paternalism.  
MacKay argues that according to the three principles of WSP listed above, unconditional 
cash transfers would not be considered paternalistic, but if a program in question meets all three 
principles, conditional cash transfers would be considered paternalistic (2019a: 10). Both pUCTs 
and sCCTs meet the first two conditions for WSP. Regardless of conditionality, cash transfer 
programs aim to improve the wellbeing of their recipients. As of yet, there are not widespread 
voting mechanisms in place for potential cash transfer recipients to consent to the programs, so 
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the second condition for paternalism is also met. However, the third condition for WSP is where 
the distinction between pUCTs and sCCTs matters. According to MacKay (2019a: 10), 
unconditional cash transfers are not motivated by a negative judgement of the recipients’ ability 
to self-govern or make decisions regarding their welfare. Rather, pUCTs assume that recipients 
lack the external resources necessary to improve their standard of living to a certain level 
(Anderson et al., 2017). Conditional cash transfers, however, often are motivated by and express 
such a negative judgement about recipients’ decision-making and self-governance abilities. It is 
important to note that not all CCTs will meet the third condition for WSP. If the program in 
question uses conditions for the purpose of promoting health according to the state’s duty of 
justice, then it is not paternalistic (MacKay, 2019a: 11). Therefore, each cash transfer program 
must be judged individually on its motivations for attaching, or not attaching, conditions. CCTs 
that are motivated by a negative judgement of the recipients’ ability to self-govern or make 
decisions meet the third condition for WSP and can be deemed paternalistic.  
According to a meta-review on CT programs, cash transfers are conditioned for three 
main reasons:   
First, agents do not always act in the ways we would expect fully informed, rational 
agents to act. Second, a body of evidence also shows that people often suffer self-control 
problems in the immediate term that do not match their long-term attitude toward the 
future, also known as hyperbolic discounting. Finally, there may be conflicts of interest 
within the household on how to spend cash that may not result in the best use of 
resources for the children living there and that may result in sub-optimal intergenerational 
outcomes. (Anderson et al. 2017: 6) 
 
As described above, the researchers and policymakers designing and implementing cash transfers 
with conditions attached are making the paternalistic assumptions that CCT recipients 1) are not 
necessarily rational, 2) suffer from self-control problems, and 3) cannot resolve household 
conflict regarding intergenerational financial decisions. The first and second reasons for 
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conditions are negative judgements about cash transfer recipients’ ability to make their own life 
decisions and are therefore paternalistic. The third reason for conditions exemplifies a literally 
“parental” attitude; it is assumed that the decisions necessitated by conditions can provide better 




With regard to the final point made above, it is possible that many CCTs are better 
categorized as parent-targeted paternalistic policies than welfare-state paternalistic policies. 
Regarding the first condition for PTP, if the motivation for implementing a CCT is to promote 
the welfare of children in a recipient household through targeting the financial decisions of their 
parents, the state implementing the cash transfer program aligns with PTP. Perez-Muñoz (2017: 
441) states that many CCTs do indeed involve grants to households that specifically target 
children. The delineation is important because in MacKay’s view, PTP may be more ethically 
permissible than WSP. As will be explained, MacKay argues that in most cases, WSP commits a 
“complex dignitary wrong” against its targets if they are competent adults—a wrong which may 
or may not be ethically permissible. However, the paternalistic measures of PTP ensure that 
parents meet the obligations they have to their children, so there is less burden on the state to 
justify PTP, compared to WSP (MacKay, 2019b: 15). MacKay (2019b: 15) explains that a policy 
can satisfy all three conditions for PTP and still be a just policy if the negative judgment of the 
parents’ ability to provide for the welfare of their children is “warranted.” In other words, if 
parents are incompetent, targeting anti-poverty policies toward them in a paternalistic manner for 
the purpose of improving their children’s wellbeing is justified. MacKay labels PTP directed 
toward incompetent adults as “soft” PTP, which on his view, is ethically permissible (2019b: 
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15). PTP directed toward competent adults, however, is considered “hard” PTP, which MacKay 
(2019b: 15) argues commits a complex dignitary wrong against those adults. 
 
MacKay’s objection: the dignitary wrong of paternalism 
MacKay (2019a: 16) argues that when CCTs are paternalistic, they commit a “complex 
dignitary wrong” against cash transfer recipients. This dignitary wrong is complex because it is 
two-fold, involving comparative and non-comparative components (MacKay, 2019a: 16). In 
most cases, it seems that CCTs are guilty of both the comparative and non-comparative 
components of a complex dignitary wrong. The comparative wrong, or treatment of the cash 
transfer recipient as having inferior status, comes into play with the strong assumption behind the 
use of conditions that the reason they are needed is because recipients are not rational and do not 
practice sufficient self-control, as demonstrated in the earlier quotation from Anderson et al. 
(2017: 6). That the policymaker is considered better positioned to make decisions on behalf of 
CCT recipients than the recipients themselves represents a comparative wrong (MacKay, 2019a: 
15). The non-comparative wrong of the conditions attached to cash transfers relates to the 
assumption that recipients are not autonomous enough to make good decisions for themselves. 
The complex dignitary wrong is not dependent on whether the paternalistic policy interferes with 
the autonomy of its target. However, it should be noted that an additional wrong, which MacKay 
(2019a: 16) notes as an interference wrong, is committed if the policy does interfere with its 
target’s autonomy.  
That paternalistic welfare policies commit a complex dignitary wrong against their 
recipients outlines a good case that CCTs may be ethically impermissible. However, on 
MacKay’s view, WSP and hard PTP are only pro tanto wrong, or wrong to some extent (2019a: 
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15). A policy that is pro tanto wrong is not automatically impermissible from an ethical 
standpoint. MacKay describes a number factors that contribute to the degree of pro tanto 
wrongness of paternalistic welfare policies. According to MacKay (2019a: 24-25), the pro tanto 
wrongness of a WSP policy depends on five factors: 
1. “The target’s degree of decision-making capacity” 
2. “Whether the policy is means or ends paternalism” 
3. “The policy’s degree of singling out” 
4. “Whether the target population supports or opposes the policy” 
5. “The policy’s degree of autonomy infringement” 
The first factor considers the accuracy of the assumption that the targets of WSP (non-competent 
adults) have cognitive biases that negatively affect their decision-making processes such that 
paternalistic measures are necessary to ensure they make the most beneficial choices (MacKay, 
2019a: 18-19). The second factor differentiates “means paternalism,” in which paternalistic 
welfare policies address the avenues through which people realize their goals or values, from 
“ends paternalism,” in which paternalistic welfare policies address those goals or values 
themselves (MacKay 2019a: 19). MacKay explains, “The choice of ends is value-laden, 
expressing a person’s judgment of which sorts of activities are worth doing and which goals are 
worth pursuing; the choice of means, by contrast, is simply a matter of instrumental reasoning” 
(2019a: 20). Because self-determination of goals and values is central to the identity of humans, 
MacKay argues that ends paternalism is much more intrusive, and therefore morally worse, than 
means paternalism (2019a: 20-21).  
 The third degree of wrongness considers whether the paternalistic welfare policy “singles 
out” certain populations as having greater deficiency in decision-making than other populations 
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(MacKay 2019a: 21-22). For example, if a policy is motivated by or expresses the judgment that 
people with low incomes are considered to be less capable of making decisions than 
policymakers, the policy is morally wrong in that it singles out people with low incomes 
(MacKay 2019a: 22). The fourth degree of wrongness considers the hypothetical consent of 
targeted populations to the paternalism embedded in the policy directed at them (MacKay 2019a: 
22). Recall that if a government obtains actual consent from its citizens, that authorization 
renders a policy that would otherwise be considered paternalistic to not meet the definition of 
WSP (MacKay 2019a: 22). In MacKay’s view, if a population supports a paternalistic welfare 
policy, then it is less wrong than if they were to not support it (MacKay 2019a: 22-23).  
Finally, the wrongness of WSP depends on the degree to which the policy infringes upon 
people’s autonomy (MacKay 2019a: 23). Infringing autonomy can come in many forms, 
including restricting choices or implementing “nudges.” In MacKay’s view, the degree of 
wrongness depends on how much the policy uses non-rational means (targeting people’s 
emotional or psychological decision-making capacities) to control people’s choices (MacKay 
2019a: 24). The severity of this effort to control people’s choices depends on the type of non-
rational means used to control—including coercion, nudges, and incentives, which will be 
discussed in the Nudges and softer conditions section of this chapter.  
According to MacKay (2019b: 18-20), the pro tanto wrongness of hard PTP depends on 
four factors:  
1. “Number of people targeted for whom the policy is ends paternalism” 
2. “Degree of singling-out” 
3. “Number of people targeted who oppose the policy” 
4. “Degree of autonomy infringement” 
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The first factor concerns the scope of the ends paternalism aspect of the PTP policy. If many 
parents targeted by the policy do not share the same goal at the policy is promoting, the policy is 
more wrong than if most parents targeted did agree with the ends promoted by the policy 
(MacKay 2019b: 19). The second factor, degree of singling out, is the same as discussed within 
the WSP framework. The third factor is similar to the fourth factor above in the WSP framework, 
but it does not take into account only whether the targeted population supports the paternalistic 
policy, but also the number of people who oppose it. The fourth factor, degree of autonomy 
infringement, is the same as discussed within the WSP framework.  
On MacKay’s view, CCTs could be ethically permissible if the reason for attaching 
conditions to cash transfer programs, promotion of recipients’ wellbeing, outweighs the dignitary 
wrong committed.  For example, if empirical evidence shows CCTs to be significantly more 
effective at achieving poverty alleviation outcomes in comparison to UCTs, then the expected 
increase in recipients’ wellbeing may override the dignitary wrong committed against them.  
 In summary, when WSP and PTP target competent adults, they commit a complex 
dignitary wrong against them. Thus far, this thesis has argued that sCCTs are usually 
paternalistic (whether that paternalism falls within WSP or PTP) and thus pro tanto wrong. 
However, the wrong committed against sCCT recipients could be overridden by empirical 
evidence on the efficacy of attaching conditions to cash transfers.  
 
 Other objections to attaching conditions to cash transfers 
Pérez-Muñoz (2017: 445-446) outlines six objections against conditions, three of which 
point to the effect conditionality may have on recipients and three of which focus on the 
implementation of CT programs. The objections can be summarized as follows: 
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1. Conditions may increase the burden on already vulnerable populations by excluding 
needy households that cannot comply with the requirements from receiving cash aid. 
At the extreme, imposing conditional policies may be worse than the status quo. 
2. The monitoring and evaluating of conditions, where it exists, “is potentially both 
intrusive and stigmatizing” in that it may undermine respect for the capacity of CCT 
recipients to take care of their children (pp. 445-446).  
3. CCTs are not a complete social safety net and therefore do not respect everyone’s 
social and economic rights.  
4. CCTs are objectionable when public education and health services in a given country 
are not also improving because in that case, it cannot be expected that cash transfers 
are enough to make meaningful progress toward human capital objectives. 
5.  “Conditionalities generate opportunities for corruption,” (p. 446). 
6. CCTs have higher administrative costs than UCTs. 
The first and second objections above are valid considerations from an ethical standpoint. 
The third through sixth are mentioned so briefly in Pérez-Muñoz’s paper that it is difficult to 
analyze them. They encompass wide-ranging, nebulous issues impossible to generalize beyond 
one program or country at a time.  
Concerning the first objection above, that conditions are morally wrong because they 
burden already oppressed populations, Pérez-Muñoz references Standing (2011) on the 
“security-difference principle,” in which Standing states that redistributive policies are just only 
if they reduce the insecurity of the least secure groups. According to Standing, CCTs do not 
satisfy this principle because they complicate the process to receive benefits. Standing’s 
objection may not be relevant if it is true that UCTs can be similarly confusing or exclusive if 
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operating under non-hard conditionality (Pérez-Muñoz, 2017: 449). Standing couples the 
security-difference principle with the “Paternalist Test Principle,” which states that to be 
considered just, redistributive policies must not impose greater restrictions on “less free” groups 
in society than the restrictions imposed on “more free” groups (Pérez-Muñoz, 2017: 449). 
According to Standing, CCTs fail this principle by restricting the ultra-poor’s access to cash 
transfer funds by requiring them to meet conditions before receiving the money (Pérez-Muñoz, 
2017: 449).  
As Pérez-Muñoz (2017: 450) points out, most ethical objections raised against CCTs, 
including Objections 2, 4, 5, and 6 above, do not target conditionality specifically, but criticize 
how well (or poorly) the program is run. Many other objections, such as the third above, and 
Standing’s Paternalist Test Principle, also do not hold in the sCCT context because a condition 
requiring children to attend school often mirrors the mandatory school attendance for the general 
population, regardless of income or “freedom,” as Standing writes (Pérez-Muñoz, 2017: 451). 
Freeland (2007: 75) offers four additional objections to CCTs, calling them “superfluous, 
pernicious, atrocious, and abominable.” Freeland considers CCTs “physically pernicious” due to 
the ambiguity of what “conditional” entails. Freeland’s analysis is less so directed at conditions 
than the characteristic of a welfare program being contingent on some other factor(s). Freeland 
lists the eligibility requirements and targeting components of CT programs as an example. 
However, those features of CT programs are universally accepted as administrative policy 
measures to ensure that the programs first reach the neediest before being scaled up (Pellerano & 
Barca, 2014).  
Freeland (2007: 75) considers the term “conditional” to be “politically abominable” 
because in their view, it is an extension of Bretton-Woods era paternalism. Freeland’s complaint 
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is not directed toward the nature of CCTs, but the naming; they propose replacing “conditional” 
with “compactual.” In Freeland’s view, this renaming would reflect the sense of compact, or 
partnership, CT programs convey as social protection policies that is not present in labor-based 
welfare programs. In their book Inclusive Social Protection in Latin America: A Comprehensive, 
Rights-based Approach, Cecchini and Martínez (2012), two Latin American scholars, write 
extensively on the compactual nature of Latin American CCTs, in which the state and the 
household are jointly responsible for poverty alleviation. Considering Freeland’s objection here 
is solely based on language, it does not hold as a valid objection against attaching conditions to 
CT programs. 
Freeland’s third objection to CCTs is that they are “economically superfluous” (2007: 
760). The argument here is brief, pointing out the need to differentiate the impacts due to the 
transfer from the impacts due to the conditions placed on that transfer. Freeland’s paper was 
published in 2007, and since then, many scholars have done analyses to separate the impacts of 
cash transfers from their conditions (Benhassine et al. 2015; Akresh et al. 2013; Handa et al. 
2009; Pace et al. 2016). Since the results have been mixed, the conclusion cannot be that CCTs 
are economically superfluous. Freeland’s fourth objection to CCTs is ethical, claiming that they 
are “morally atrocious” (2007: 77). Freeland writes, “it is morally highly questionable whether a 
government (often encouraged by donors) can, on the one hand, proudly tell its citizens that 
social protection is their basic ‘human right’; and then, on the other hand, threaten to deprive the 
neediest among them of that very ‘right’ if they fail to meet certain ‘conditions’ (2007: 77). 
Freeland cites the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 2013 Livingstone Call for 
Action (signed by 13 African countries in Livingstone, Zambia), as the basis for nations claiming 
social protection as a human right. As Freeland’s ethical objection focuses more on 
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governmental hypocrisy than the nature of conditions themselves, it is less relevant to this thesis, 
which examines the nature of conditions. 
 
Ethical permissibility of strong paternalism 
 
Philosopher Sarah Conly (2013) presents one case in favor of state paternalism, with the 
basis that behavioral science has repeatedly shown that humans are, to some extent, irrational. 
Conly considers a human’s “actual ability” to be their decision-making ability minus any 
cognitive biases present (2019: 2). Because humans are not perfect decision-making machines, 
Conly (2013) states that it is ethically justifiable to use public policy to nudge, incentivize, or 
coerce citizens into making choices which will increase their wellbeing. Without those nudges, 
incentives, or coercions, citizens might continue to make irrational choices that will not 
maximize their wellbeing. Conly (as cited in MacKay 2019a) writes: “Realism cannot be 
degrading, and treating people in accordance with their actual abilities is not insulting or 
disrespectful. Recognition of our actual status is all respect can call for” (pp. 19-20).  
The categories of nudges, incentives, and coercions will be revisited in the Ethics of 
Behavior Modification section in this chapter. At this point, we cannot determine whether the 
conditions attached to cash transfers are considered to be nudges, incentives, or coercions. This 
thesis takes the view that such a categorization depends on three things: the recipient household’s 
baseline circumstances, the amount of the transfer, and the implementation of the transfer. 
Therefore, conditions may be categorized by their degree of paternalism only when considered 
within a case study of a specific program. A household’s baseline experience of poverty will 
dictate their perception of welfare assistance and their willingness to accept certain conditions to 
receive said assistance. It is not within the scope of this paper to outline a policy framework that 
can give a sweeping generalization of which types of households may experience the same 
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conditions attached to the same cash transfer program as a nudge, incentive, or coercion. 
However, this thesis will examine the final category, relating to the implementation of the cash 
transfer program. Chapter Five will study the Social Cash Transfer in Malawi, the Child Grant 
Programme in Zambia, and the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer in Zimbabwe, as case studies 
to examine the normative implications of their implementations as related to conditionality.  
Regardless of their categorization, the conditions attached to CT programs are 
paternalistic in most cases, and on Conly (2013)’s view, ethically permissible, because their 
purpose is to further the wellbeing of cash transfer recipients. On Conly (2013)’s view, sCCTs 
can be considered a form of means paternalism, or paternalism that aids people to achieve goals 
they already have. In the case of cash transfer programs, recipients and program implementers 
alike share the goals of promoting basic human healthcare and education. The strong conditions 
present in sCCTs represent means paternalism in that they help recipients achieve better health 
and education outcomes.  
 
 
Nudges and softer conditions  
 
 Not all conditions can be considered “hard” or “strong.” There exists a strictness 
spectrum of policy interventions that includes many types of “softer” interventions. 
Conditionality is one such intervention. There is not a scholarly consensus on whether the 
conditions attached to cash transfers should be considered hard or soft. In their paper titled 
“Turning a Nudge into a Shove? A ‘Labeled Cash Transfer’ for Education,” Benhassine et al. 
(2015: 87) state that CCTs (assumedly with strong, enforced conditionality) operate as a “big 
shove.” A labeled cash transfer or other, softer form of conditionality may operate more as a 
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“nudge,” according to Benhassine et al. (2015: 87). However, most scholars interpret “nudges” 
within the CT program realm to relate to aspects of the program, not the program itself.  
 Cecchini & Martínez (2012: 95) consider “soft” conditions to be those that “reinforce and 
protect human capital” through “lax monitoring and penalties,” versus “hard” conditions to be 
those that are strictly monitored and enforced in order to induce behavioral change. Pellerano & 
Barca (2014) consider hard conditions to be only those behaviors upon which payment is 
contingent. Eligibility criteria, program implementation features, and soft conditionality are all 
permissible levels of conditionality for a program to contain and still be considered formally 
unconditional, according to Pellerano & Barca (2014: 6).  
 
Ethics of behavior modification 
 
 In a forthcoming paper on the ethics of organ donation policy, MacKay & Saylor outline 
levels of “invasion” of public health interventions: coercive measures, incentives, messaging, 
and nudges (forthcoming: 1). The objections MacKay & Saylor (forthcoming: 1-2) raise apply to 
the public health context and not to a cash transfer policy context, but the categories, outlined 
below, remain relevant.  
 Coercion: Coercive measures require competent adults to comply with certain 
stipulations.  
 Incentives: Measures that offer “bonuses” to people who comply are called incentives, 
and they influence decision-making by adjusting the relative costs and benefits of the options a 
person has by forcing at least one option to be relatively more beneficial.  
 Nudges: Sometimes operating as negative incentives, nudges are relatively new in the 
public policy context. These measures employ non-rational (psychological) tactics to persuade 
people to make a choice which the government (or other entity “in charge”) considers to be best.  
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 Messaging: Information campaigns employ persuasive messaging to convince people to 
adopt certain practices without necessarily requiring or incentivizing them to do so.  
 
 
Normative framework: the spectrum of conditionality  
 
To appropriately analyze the ethical implications of conditions, the spectrum of 
conditions must be aligned with the spectrum of paternalistic interventions. See Diagrams 2.1 
and 2.2 below. All positions of conditions on the spectrum are relative; the magnitude of the 




Diagram 2.1: Spectrum of Paternalistic Interventions 
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This spectrum of conditionality will be revisited in Chapter Five, where it will be applied 
as a normative framework to analyze each of three UCT programs in Southern Africa. In that 
chapter, the analysis will ask the following question:  
• Is there an ethical difference between perceived and hard conditionality and therefore a 
moral reason to favor one over another? 
 
  
Diagram 2.2: Normative Spectrum of Conditionality 
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 To determine the impact of UCT beneficiaries’ perceptions of program rules on their 
actual spending behavior, data from UCTs in Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are considered. 
Datasets analyzed in this thesis are all used with permission from the Transfer Project (see 
https://transfer.cpc.unc.edu/), which has helped to implement and analyze dozens of cash transfer 
programs in SSA. In six of the countries (Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe) where the Transfer Project works, the household questionnaires for the UCTs 
included Operations modules, which ask beneficiaries about their experience with the 
administrative side of the programs. In the Operations module, beneficiaries are asked whether 
they consider the program to have rules and if so, what those rules are and who is promoting 
them. Among those six countries, this thesis considers Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe due to 
their regional proximity within Southern Africa. By focusing on Southern Africa, this thesis 
builds on the current literature. One of the two existing studies that uses the same quantitative 
methodology analyzes a UCT in Lesotho, also in Southern Africa (Pace et al., 2014).  
 
Malawi 
The Social Cash Transfer Program (SCTP) in Malawi, implemented by the Ministry of 
Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare (MoGCDSW), began in 2013 and targeted ultra-
poor, labor-constrained households. Households were eligible (but not guaranteed) to receive 
transfers if they were both ultra-poor and labor-constrained. The operational definition of “ultra-
poor” was that households were unable to meet their most basic needs, including food, clothing, 
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and soap. “Labor-constrained” was defined as having a household ratio of unfit-to-work versus 
fit-to-work household members of greater than 3. “Fit” workers were 18-64 years in age and do 
not have chronic illnesses or disabilities that prevent them from working. The SCTP transfer 
involved payments of 1,000 to 2,400 Malawian Kwacha (MK), with the amount varying based 
on the number and age of children in the family at the baseline evaluation, which occurred in 
2013. The transfer amount was equivalent to $2-6 USD, or about 17% of household 
consumption. Payments were made either monthly or bimonthly (Carolina Population Center, 
2014).   
 The SCTP was evaluated with a mixed-methods study designed as a longitudinal, cluster-
based randomized controlled trial (cRCT) with an additional qualitative assessment. This thesis 
analyzes only the quantitative data from the SCTP. Village clusters were randomly assigned to 
treatment or delayed entry (control) status. The study evaluated 15 village clusters in Salima 
district and 14 village clusters in Mangochi district. At baseline in 2013, the sample included 
3,531 households with 16,078 total individuals. There were 14 village clusters in the treatment 
sample (1,678 households) and 15 village clusters in the control (delayed entry) sample (1,853 
households). Both treatment and control households met eligibility requirements for the transfer 
program. Household selection was “blind” such that the clusters were categorized into treatment 
and control groups after the baseline survey was complete (Carolina Population Center, 2014). 
According to the baseline evaluation report, hundreds of variables were tested for balance and 
only a handful were statistically significantly different (Carolina Population Center, 2014).  
The SCTP evaluation utilized survey instruments that included an extensive household 
questionnaire, which can be found on the Transfer Project’s website at 
https://transfer.cpc.unc.edu/instruments/malawi-instruments/. This questionnaire, repeated over 
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multiple follow-up evaluations, included a comprehensive “operations module,” asking about 
how the program was run (Center for Social Research at the University of Malawi, 2013; 2014; 
2015; Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2014). 
Datasets from the household questionnaires in 2013 and 2015, evaluated by this thesis, include 
longitudinal panel data (Transfer Project, 2015a; 2015b; 2015c; 2015d).  
 
Zambia 
The Child Grant Programme (CGP) in Zambia, implemented by the Ministry of 
Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS), began in 2010 and targeted households 
with children under 5 years old. Since the districts chosen—Shangomobo, Kaputa, and Kalabo—
were high-poverty districts, effectively, the program targeted high-poverty households with 
young children. At baseline, only households with children under 3 years old were selected for 
the evaluation sample, to ensure that a young-enough cohort existed to observe effects on the 
nutritional status of children as they aged. The CGP involved monthly cash transfers of 55,000 
Zambian Kwacha (ZMW), equivalent to $11 USD. The transfer amount, considered enough to 
purchase one meal per day for a household of median size (5 people) for one month, was 
consistent across the sample and did not vary based on household size. The transfer was 
equivalent to about 27% of a household’s monthly expenditure (American Institutes for 
Research, 2011).  
 The CGP was evaluated as a longitudinal RCT. Communities were randomly assigned to 
treatment or delayed entry (control). The sample included 90 communities, with about 30 in each 
of the 3 districts (Shangomobo, Kaputa, and Kalabo). Assignment of communities to treatment 
and control groups was “blind” at baseline; treatment status was assigned after baseline data 
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collection began. Within each community, about 28 of 100 eligible households were randomly 
sampled to be included in the study. The treatment and control groups were tested for statistical 
equivalence at baseline across 61 different variables, 12 of which were found to be statistically 
significantly different, but only 1 of which had a large difference in standard deviation. There 
were 1,228 households in the treatment group and 1,287 households in the control group at 
baseline in 2010. The study sample at baseline included 2,515 households with 14,565 
individuals, 95% of whom lived in extreme poverty (American Institutes for Research, 2011).  
The CGP evaluation utilized survey instruments that included an extensive household 
questionnaire, which can be found on the Transfer Project’s website at 
https://transfer.cpc.unc.edu/instruments/zambia-instruments/. This questionnaire, repeated over 
multiple follow-up evaluations, included a comprehensive “operations module,” asking about 
how the program was run (Transfer Project, 2010; 2012; 2013d; 2014a; 2017b). Datasets from 
the household questionnaires in 2010 and 2013, evaluated by this thesis, include longitudinal 
panel data (Transfer Project, 2013a; 2013b; 2013c). 
 
Zimbabwe 
The Harmonised Social Cash Transfer Programme (HSCT), implemented by the Ministry 
of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare (MPSLSW), began in 2013 and targeted ultra-
poor, labor-constrained households, similar to the Malawi SCTP. Households were eligible (but 
not guaranteed) to receive transfers if they were both ultra-poor (living below the food poverty 
line) and labor-constrained. The transfer was administered in bimonthly payments equivalent to 
$10-25 USD, depending on household size (American Institutes for Research, 2014). 
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Unlike the SCTP in Malawi and CGP in Zambia, the HSCT in Zimbabwe was evaluated 
through non-experimental methods. The longitudinal evaluation was a mixed-methods, “district-
matched case-control” study, comparing transfer-receiving households in treatment districts with 
eligible households in districts where the transfer had not yet been implemented. Treatment 
districts were Binga (Matabeleland North Province), Mwenzi (Masvingo Province), and Mudzi 
(Mashonaland East Province), where the program had already been implemented, and 
comparison districts were UMP (Mashonaland East), Chiredzi (Masvingo), and Hwange 
(Matabeleland North), which had not yet begun receiving the transfer during the evaluation. The 
implementing Ministry in Zimbabwe determined that a non-experimental approach of 
implementing the policy by district and not by villages or households within the district was the 
most ethically and politically feasible way to roll out the program over time. Instead of randomly 
selecting the control group, wards in comparison regions were chosen to match the treatment 
wards based on “agro-ecological characteristics,” (geographic proximity), culture, and level of 
development (American Institutes for Research, 2014). The treatment and control wards were 
tested for balance across 56 variables at baseline, eight of which were statistically significantly 
different, but none of which differed by more than 0.25 standard deviations. At baseline in 2013, 
there were 3,063 households in the sample, with 2,029 households in the treatment group and 
1,034 households in the comparison group. The sample involved in 90 wards (60 treatment and 
30 comparison) across 6 districts. About 34 eligible households from each of the 90 wards were 
randomly selected to be included in the study sample (American Institutes for Research, 2013). 
The HSCT evaluation utilized survey instruments that included an extensive household 
questionnaire, which can be found on the Transfer Project’s website at 
https://transfer.cpc.unc.edu/instruments/zimbabwe-instruments/. This questionnaire, repeated 
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over multiple follow-up evaluations, included a comprehensive “operations module,” asking 
about how the program was run (Transfer Project, 2013e; 2014b; ZimStat, 2017). Datasets from 
the household questionnaires in 2013 and 2017, evaluated by this thesis, include longitudinal 
panel data (Transfer Project, 2017a; 2017c; 2017d). 
 
Quantitative Methods 
This thesis evaluates the SCTP in Malawi, CGP in Zambia, and HSCT in Zimbabwe 
using a mixed-method analysis. Overall, the selection of the three countries represents a cluster 
sample of instances, or cases, of unconditional cash transfer programs in sub-Saharan Africa, 
specifically, Southern Africa. Furthermore, each of the three countries used a different level of 
additional “nudges” in program design, and this thesis’ country selection is thus representative 
on the criterion of education-related program nudges. 
 In Malawi, there was a heavy nudge (additional cash) related to child education 
(Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Welfare [MoGCSW], 2018). The MoGCSW refers to 
the nudge as a “school bonus incentive” for the purpose of promoting education. According to 
the Operations Manual of the program in Malawi, “The role of the incentive requirement is to 
ensure that children go to school, which fosters the long-term human capital development of the 
child (MoGCSW 2018: 14). The education bonus program was implemented in conjunction with 
the beginning of the SCT program. It provided an extra MK 300 per child in primary school and 
MK 600 per child in secondary school (MoGCSW, 2018: 13). In discussions with Sudhanshu 
Handa, the Primary Investigator for the evaluations of the SCTP in Malawi, the CGP in Zambia, 
and the HSCT in Zimbabwe, it became clear that on the ground in Malawi, social workers 
promote strong messaging to cash transfer recipients that the money is to be used for education 
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(S. Handa, personal interview, March 6, 2020). This messaging, coupled with the school 
bonuses, has led the Malawian program to be explicit in its goal to promote education. This 
thesis explores whether that messaging leads to recipients interpreting the program to be 
conditional on educational expenditures and therefore spending more on education.   
In Zambia, Handa said there is no messaging on the ground of which program evaluators 
are aware. However, by naming the program Child Grant Program and targeting families with 
children under age 5, the national government has sent the implicit message that the funds are to 
be spent on young children’s needs (S. Handa, personal interview, March 6, 2020). This implicit 
messaging could be interpreted as a “light nudge” toward spending in areas that benefit young 
children—nutrition, clothing, and possibly education.  
In Zimbabwe, Handa said that the implementing Ministry and district-level 
administrators perceive the program to be a child protection program, but that evaluators are not 
aware of any perceptions individual beneficiaries might hold (S. Handa, personal interview, 
March 6, 2020). Program administrators consider the HSCT to be a child protection program 
because it was conceived as part of the National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable 
Children (NAP), which was first created in 2004 as a response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
(Ministry of Labour and Social Services [MoLSS], 2011). The first pillar of NAP is 
“Strengthening the Household Economy,” which is defined as “Increase the incomes of 250,000 
extremely poor households, particularly those with orphans and vulnerable children, through 
systems such as cash transfers, to build a healthy and supportive family environment” (MoLSS, 
2011: vi). Funding for the pilot and initial scale-up phases of the HSCT came from the second 
phase of NAP (S. Handa, personal interview, March 6, 2020). 
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Data 
 All data analyzed in this thesis were shared in de-identified form by the Transfer Project 
and used with explicit permission of Transfer Project research personnel. For each country, 
multiple datasets were merged so that household-level outcomes, household-level control 
variables, individual-level outcomes, and Operations module data could be analyzed together. 
This merging led to some minor attrition in the sample because the Operations data were 
gathered at endline, whereas the other data had values for both baseline and endline. In Malawi, 
139 household-level observations could not be matched with the operations data due to attrition 
and 150 individual-level observations could not be matched due to attrition. In Zambia, two of 
31,160 individual-level observations could not be matched due to attrition. In Zimbabwe, 473 of 
5,606 household-level observations and 473 of 21,594 individual-level observations could not be 
matched with the operations data due to the addition of household members between baseline 
and endline.   
 
Research Question and Key Variables 
The research questions explored in the following quantitative analysis are: In 
unconditional cash transfer programs in Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe: 
• Do beneficiaries’ perceptions align with the actual rules of the program? 
• How do beneficiaries’ perceptions of program rules shape their behavior and therefore, 
the impact of the program? 
 
The independent variable in this research is perception of program conditionality. In each 
of the three countries, multiple waves of data were collected. In follow-up waves, the 
beneficiaries’ perceptions of program conditionality were gauged by specific survey questions, 
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starting with, “Do families participating in the cash transfer programme have to follow any rules 
in order to continue receiving payments?” which takes binary values. If the respondent answers 
“yes,” they are asked a series of follow-up questions, starting with “Can you please list the rules 
that you think cash transfer families have to follow in order to receive the full payment from the 
programme?” See Figures 1a-c in Appendix A. 
The answer choices describe the behavior(s) on which the beneficiaries consider the 
transfer money to be conditional. The types of behaviors inform the selection of dependent 
variables, the expenditure categories, or the other outcomes that would fulfill such behavioral 
“requirements.” For example, if the perceived rule is “enrolment/attendance in primary and 
secondary schools,” the selected dependent variable is education expenditure. Respondents were 
allowed to list up to three perceived rules. The data are coded as “primary,” “secondary,” and 
“tertiary” rules. However, there cannot be certainty that the primary rule recorded in the data was 
the first rule listed by a respondent, nor can it be assumed that the primary rule was the most 
important to the respondent. For these reasons, this analysis summed the instances of perceived 
rules across the three opportunities to list a rule.  Thus, respondents who perceived an “education 
rule” include those who perceived the program’s “primary rule” to be education-related, those 
who perceived the program’s “secondary rule” to be education-related, and those who perceived 
the program’s “tertiary rule” to be education-related. In instances where multiple answer choices 
pertained to a certain outcome category, those instances were also summed. For example, in 
Malawi and Zimbabwe, three answer choices pertained to education: “enrolment/attendance in 
primary school,” “enrolment/attendance in secondary school,” and “purchase of school 
supplies.” Respondents who listed one of those rules as the primary, secondary, and/or tertiary 
rule were counted as perceiving an “education rule.” Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below describe how the 
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answer choices from the survey questions about rules then translated into a “rule category” of 
education, food, clothing, or investment. The answer choices in the Zambia survey varied 
slightly from those in Zimbabwe and Malawi, hence the separate table. Note that some answer 
choices did not align with an outcome category of interest. There were not data that accurately 
captured the potential “health rule” or “debt rule” outcomes, so those perceptions were 
eliminated from analysis. In Malawi, about 3.0% of rule instances were excluded; in Zambia, 
18.4% were excluded; in Zimbabwe, 28.3% were excluded. Table 3.3 lists the dependent 
variables chosen as outcomes to represent the rule categories in each country. 
 
Table 3.1: Latent and manifest “rule categories” in Malawi and Zimbabwe 
Survey answer option 
(verbatim) 
Corresponding rule category Applicable countries 
1. Enrolment/attendance in 
primary school 
2. Enrolment/attendance in 
secondary school 
3. Purchase of school supplies 
(books, uniform, etc)  
“education rule” Malawi, Zimbabwe 
4. attendance to health facility 
for immunizations/obtain 
under 5 health card 
5. attendance to health facility 
for growth monitoring 
8. birth certificate for children 
10.pay off debt 
11. other, specify 
12. don’t know 
none  
6. adequate food and nutrition 
for children  
“food rule” Malawi 
7. clean and appropriate 
clothing for children 
“clothing rule” Malawi 
9. invest in farm or non-farm 
business 
“investment rule” Malawi, Zimbabwe 
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Table 3.2: Latent and manifest “rule categories” in Zambia 
 
Survey answer option (verbatim) Corresponding rule category 
1.enrolment/attendance in primary and 
secondary schools 
“education rule” 
2. attendance to health facility for 
immunizations 
3. attendance to health facility for growth 
monitoring 
4. attendance to health facility for vitamin A 
supplement 
7. obtain under 5-card (health card) 
8. birth certificate for children 
9. other, specify 
10. don’t know 
none 
5. adequate food and nutrition for children “food rule” 
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Table 3.3: Outcome variables by country 
Outcome Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe 
Education Per capita educational 
expenditures 
Per capita educational 
expenditures 
School enrollment for 
children ages 5-12 
School enrollment for 
children ages 13-17 
Per capita educational 
expenditures 
Clothing Child owning shoes 
Child owning blanket 
Child owning change   
of clothes 
Per capita clothing 
expenditures 
Child owning shoes 
Child owning blanket 
Child owning change   
of clothes 




Food Per capita food 
expenditures 
Meeting the WHO’s 
feeding requirements for 
infants 
Per capita food 
expenditures 
None 
Investment Ownership of a goat, 
sheep, or chicken 




None Ownership of six key 
assets (ax, chicken 
house, sickle, livestock 
kraal, ox plow, yoke) 
Livestock ownership 





Control variables included household demographic characteristics, such as the age, sex, 
marital status, and education of the household head, shown specifically in Table 3.4. In Zambia, 
over 99% of household heads were female, so gender of household head was not included as a 
control variable, to prevent collinearity.  
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Table 3.4: Control variables by country 
Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe 
Geography 
Gender of household head 
Age of household head 
Literacy of household head 
Whether household head is 
widowed 
Household size 
Number of children birth to 
age 5 
Number of children ages 6-11 
Number of children ages 12-
17 
Number of household 
members ages 18-65 
Geography 
Age of household head 
Whether household head ever 
attended school 
Whether household head is 
widowed 
Household size 
Number of children birth to 
age 5 
Number of children ages 6-12 
Number of children ages 13-
18 
Number of household 
members ages 19-35 
Number of household 
members ages 36-55 
Number of household 
members ages 56-69 
Geography 
Gender of household head 
Age of household head 
Whether household head ever 
attended school 
Whether household head is 
widowed 
Household size 
Number of children birth to 
age 5 
Number of children ages 6-12 
Number of children ages 13-
18 
Number of household 
members ages 19-35 
Number of household 
members ages 36-55 
Number of household 
members ages 56-69 
 
Regressions 
The main analysis of this research is a multi-step quantitative analysis, repeated for each 
of the three countries. First, the expenditure outcomes of interest (shown in Table 3.3 above) 
were determined by the answers to the questions in Figures 1a-c (shown in Appendix A). Most 
outcome categories corresponded to an expenditure category. For example, perception of an 
“education rule” could be compared with education expenditures. After the dependent variables 
were determined, the next step in the empirical analysis was to use a difference-in-differences 
(DID) regression to determine the impact of the cash transfer program on those expenditures of 
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interest across a period of time. The regression equation considers only households in the 
treatment group, or the beneficiaries of the program, and not the control households (because 





Y represents the outcome of interest, with subscript i representing a given household and 
subscript t representing time. RULEi, is a dummy variable, taking the value of “0” for beneficiary 
households that did not perceive the program to have a given rule and “1” for beneficiary 
households that did perceive the program to have a given rule. POSTt is also a dummy, taking the 
value of “0” at the first wave of data studied and “1” at the chronologically later wave. In 
Malawi, POST equals “1” at the 24-month endline evaluation. In Zambia, POST equals “1” at 
the 36-month “endline,” and in Zimbabwe, POST equals “1” at the 48-month endline. The 
coefficient of interest is ß3, which captures the interaction of POST and RULE, or the actual 
effect of rule perception on program outcomes, over time. The vector of household-level control 
variables is represented by Xi, and the error term by µi, t. The regression will be repeated for each 
perceived rule found. This DID in Equation (1) compares the change in a given outcome from 
baseline to follow-up between the two groups of households, those that believed that there was a 
given rule and those that did not. 
For expenditure outcomes, it is necessary to take the analysis a step further to sift out the 
effect of the program from the effect of conditionality. This section will follow Pace et al. 
(2016)’s analysis of the “soft conditionality” in Lesotho’s Child Grant Programme. Their 
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methodology tested the hypothesis that households spend transfer income differently than 
general income. To test the hypothesis, households’ marginal propensities to consume (MPC) of 
transfer versus other income must be derived. MPCs for each type of income must be calculated 
because by comparing MPCs, it can be determined whether the transfer itself has income, 
substitution, or both effects on household spending behavior.  
This thesis tests a similar hypothesis: “Households spend transfer income differently on 
expenditure categories related to perceived program rules.” To test this hypothesis, this thesis 
derives MPCs for expenditure categories but analyzes consumption data rather than income data, 
for a number of reasons. First, income was not captured in the Transfer Project’s household 
surveys, which focused on detailed expenditure reporting instead. Among the ultra-poor 
households surveyed, almost all income is consumed and very few households engage in wage 
employment, so consumption provides a good proxy measure for income. Additionally, both of 
the existing studies that analyze MPCs of cash transfers used the consumption approach, so this 
thesis follows suit.  
According to Pace et al. (2016), if conditionality has an effect on household’s spending 
decisions, it is because the transfer has both income and substitution effects. A household might 
spend more on education after receiving a transfer because they now have more income total, but 
the share of income going to education will not change. That is an income effect. If the MPCs 
for education expenditures and total expenditures are statistically equal, then the transfer had 
only an income effect. A substitution effect would entail a household choosing to spend a 
different percentage of their income on education after receiving the transfer. If the MPC for 
expenditures within a given rule category is higher than the MPC for total expenditures, then the 
transfer exerted a substitution effect toward expenditures in the rule category. If there are both 
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income and substitution effects due to the transfer, and that substitution is in favor of expenditure 
categories that relate to perceptions of “rules,” then it can be concluded that (perceived) 
conditionality has a direct effect on beneficiaries’ behavior.  
To derive the MPCs, the following multiple regression model is used for each of the three 





Y represents household expenditure on categories of interest. PCexpi represents the 
household’s total per capita expenditures. RULEi, is the same variable as in Equation (1), which 
indicates whether a household perceived a rule for a given outcome of interest. The coefficient of 
interest is ß3, which captures the interaction of RULE and PCexp. The same set of control 
variables as in the DID equation, represented by vector X, will be used. To determine if 
households spend a different amount on categories they perceive the CT program to “require,” 
the following null and alternative hypotheses will be tested: 
 
H0 : ß3 = 0     Ha : ß3 > 0 
 
The null hypothesis is that for a given expenditure category, households spend the same amount 
on it regardless of whether they perceive the program to have a rule pertaining to that category. 
The alternative hypothesis is that households that perceive a rule for a given category spend 
more money on that category.  
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Chapter Four: Quantitative Results and Discussion 
Summary of Findings 
Overall, perceived conditionality existed in all three countries, with 74.6% of recipients 
perceiving rules in Malawi, 82.9% in Zambia, and 37.4% in Zimbabwe. However, perception of 
a given rule had no statistically significant effect in any country, with a few minor exceptions 
that lack practical significance. In Malawi, perception of rules had no significant impacts. In 
Zambia, recipients who perceived the CGP to have a “food rule” were 12.6 percentage points 
more likely to meet the World Health Organization (WHO) Infant and Young Child Feeding 
(IYCF) requirements for their child. This effect can be considered an internalization of the “food 
rule” by the recipients, who then fed their infants more often. Also in Zambia, there were a few 
instances where perception of an education or clothing rule led to decreased expenditures in that 
rule category, suggesting that recipients may have already placed high value on those outcomes. 
In Zimbabwe, perception of an education rule led recipients to spend $0.03 USD more per capita 
on education, a 1.4% increase that has little practical significance. Perception of an investment 
rule had no effect in Zimbabwe.  
However, in all three countries, patterns emerged showing certain demographic types of 
households to be more susceptible to perceiving a rule. Across the board, larger households with 
younger household heads and more children were more likely to perceive rules. In all three 
countries, there were geographic disparities to rule perception, suggesting district-specific 
messaging that is confusing people about rules but not necessarily originating at the national 
level of the program. The household head’s schooling also affected their likelihood of perceiving 
a rule. In Malawi, investment rule-perceivers were more likely to be literate. In Zambia, general 
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rule-perceivers were less likely to have ever attended school, while in Zimbabwe, rule-perceivers 
were more likely to have ever attended school.  
 
Malawi 
Prevalence of rule perception 
Table 4.1: Prevalence of rule perception in Malawi 
Are there rules? Frequency Proportion of sample 
   
YES 1,188 0.746 
NO 373 0.234 
Don't know 32 0.020 
   
Observations 1,249 1,249 
Data source: The Transfer Project 
Note: Although 1,609 treatment households are considered in the DID regression analysis and coded as rule-
perceiving or non-rule-perceiving based on their perception (or lack thereof) of specific rules, only 1,249 answered 
the specific question “Are there rules?”  
 
In Malawi, at the 24-month endline, 74.6% of recipient households answered “yes” to the 
question “Do you think that families participating in the SCT programme have to follow any 
rules in order to continue receiving payments?” An additional 2.0% were unsure whether the 
program was conditional. Only 23.4% answered correctly that no, the program does not require 
that participants meet certain requirements before receiving cash. The following analysis focuses 
on the 74.6% of recipient households that did perceive at least one rule. Those households 
answered the next question in the survey: “Can you please list the rules that you think cash 
transfer families have to follow?” Each recipient was able to list up to three rules, called rule 
“instances” in this analysis. Table 4.2 below describes the total instances for each rule category.  
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Table 4.2: Most common rules perceived in Malawi 
Rules that you think cash transfer families have to follow in order to 
receive the full transfer amount 
Total instances Proportion 
Enrolment/attendance in primary school 1185 0.129 
Enrolment/attendance in secondary school 305 0.033 
Purchase of school supplies (books, uniform, etc) 1736 0.189 
Attendance to health facility for immunization/Obtain under 5 health 
card 46 0.005 
Attendance to health facility for growth monitoring 121 0.013 
Adequate food and nutrition for children 2497 0.272 
Clean and appropriate clothing for children 1300 0.142 
Birth certificate for children 12 0.001 
Invest in farm or non-farm business 1715 0.187 
Pay off debt 93 0.010 
Other 169 0.018 
Total rules perceived 9,179  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 
At a cumulative N=3,226 instances, or 35.1% of total rule instances, the “education rule” 
was the most commonly perceived rule in Malawi. The second most common rule perceived was 
the “food rule,” (27.2%), followed by the “investment rule,” (18.7%) and finally, the “clothing 
rule” (14.2%).  
 
Conditionality perception by household demographics 
 To test for any patterns across demographic types of households that perceived rules, 
baseline household characteristics were compared between rule-perceiving households and non-
rule-perceiving households, as shown below in Table 4.3. Only households in the treatment 
group were tested across these characteristics because only treatment households were asked 
about their perception of program rules. 
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Table 4.3: Baseline balance for key hhld characteristics between rule-perceiving and non-rule-
perceiving hhlds in Malawi	
Household characteristic All Treat No rules Rule(s) P-value of diff. 
Salima district 0.48 0.36 0.53 0.00 
Main respondent literate 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.20 
Main respondent female 0.83 0.84 0.82 0.23 
Main respondent age 58.16 58.95 57.82 0.34 
Main respondent widow 0.44 0.48 0.42 0.06 
Household members 0-5 years 0.67 0.59 0.70 0.06 
Household members 6-11 years 1.16 1.09 1.18 0.16 
Household members 12-17 years 0.95 0.80 1.00 0.00 
Household members 18-65 years 1.18 1.09 1.21 0.05 
Numbers of persons in household 4.57 4.22 4.69 0.00 
     
Observations 1,561 373 1,188  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 
There are significant geographic differences between rule-perceiving and non-rule 
perceiving households in Malawi, with rule-perceiving households being more likely to live in 
Salima district than Mangochi district. This finding suggests that households in the Salima 
district are receiving more messaging that makes the SCTP seem conditional. The majority of 
household demographic characteristics do not significantly differ between households that 
perceived the SCTP to have rules and households that did not. There are a few exceptions: rule-
perceiving households had, on average, 0.2 more household members ages 12-17 and 0.1 more 
household members ages 18-65 than non-rule-perceiving households. Possibly due to that 
difference, rule-perceiving households also tended to be larger, with about 4.69 members, 
compared to 4.22 members in non-rule-perceiving households. 
Beyond the overall categorization of rule-perceiving and non-rule-perceiving households, 
the means at baseline also compared baseline characteristics among education rule perceivers, 
clothing rule perceivers, food rule perceivers, and investment rule-perceivers. Table 4.4 below 
describes the difference in baseline demographic characteristics for treatment households that 
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perceived an education rule versus households that did not perceive an education rule. Tables 
4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 repeat the comparison of rule perceivers and non-rule-perceivers for the 
clothing, food, and investment categories.  
 
Table 4.4: Baseline balance for key hhld characteristics (by perceived education condition) in 
Malawi 




P-value of diff. 
Salima district 0.48 0.43 0.52 0.00 
Main respondent literate 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.29 
Main respondent female 0.83 0.81 0.84 0.12 
Main respondent age 58.16 60.92 56.27 0.00 
Main respondent widow 0.44 0.47 0.41 0.02 
Household members 0-5 years 0.67 0.53 0.76 0.00 
Household members 6-11 years 1.16 1.00 1.27 0.00 
Household members 12-17 years 0.95 0.79 1.05 0.00 
Household members 18-65 years 1.18 1.02 1.29 0.00 
Numbers of persons in household 4.57 4.04 4.93 0.00 
     
Observations 1,609 655 954  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 
It is notable that while rule-perceiving households overall had few demographic 
differences from their non-rule-perceiving counterparts, when education rule-perceivers were 
tested against non-education rule perceivers, the story changed. Similar to the trend in Table 4.3, 
education rule-perceiving households were more likely to live in Salima district than Mangochi 
district. The literacy level and gender of the household head were not statistically different 
between education rule-perceivers and non-education-rule perceivers. However, all other 
demographic characteristics tested did show significant differences. Household heads that 
perceived an education rule were 4.5 years younger, on average, and 6 percentage points less 
likely to be widowed than those who didn’t perceive an education rule. Households that 
perceived an education rule were also larger than those that didn’t, with every age group having 
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more members. It is not surprising that households with more children perceived an education 
rule because anecdotal evidence showed that social workers were telling households with 
children that the transfer money was to be spent on education; plus, those households were 
receiving an “education bonus” with their transfer.  
 
Table 4.5: Baseline balance for key hhld characteristics (by perceived clothing condition) in 
Malawi 




P-value of diff. 
Salima district 0.48 0.46 0.54 0.01 
Main respondent literate 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.87 
Main respondent female 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.30 
Main respondent age 58.16 58.59 57.12 0.18 
Main respondent widow 0.44 0.42 0.46 0.15 
Household members 0-5 years 0.67 0.62 0.79 0.00 
Household members 6-11 years 1.16 1.12 1.27 0.01 
Household members 12-17 years 0.95 0.91 1.04 0.01 
Household members 18-65 years 1.18 1.12 1.30 0.00 
Numbers of persons in household 4.57 4.41 4.94 0.00 
     
Observations 1,609 1,138 471  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 
 Households that perceived a clothing rule were more likely to live in Salima district than 
those that did not, and overall, they were larger households. Clothing rule-perceiving households 
had more children and more household members of every age category. It makes sense that 
households with more children would be more likely to perceive “clean and appropriate clothing 
for children” as a rule of the SCTP. 
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Table 4.6: Baseline balance for key hhld characteristics (by perceived food condition) in Malawi 
Household characteristic All Treat No food 
rule 
Food rule P-value of diff. 
Salima district 0.48 0.42 0.53 0.00 
Main respondent literate 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.58 
Main respondent female 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.66 
Main respondent age 58.16 59.07 57.44 0.10 
Main respondent widow 0.44 0.46 0.41 0.05 
Household members 0-5 years 0.67 0.59 0.73 0.00 
Household members 6-11 years 1.16 1.09 1.22 0.01 
Household members 12-17 years 0.95 0.86 1.02 0.00 
Household members 18-65 years 1.18 1.11 1.23 0.02 
Numbers of persons in household 4.57 4.29 4.78 0.00 
     
Observations 1,609 712 897  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 
As for the overall sample and the education and clothing rules, households that perceived 
a food rule were more likely to live in Salima district. Household heads who perceived a food 
rule were 5 percentage points less likely to be a widow. Similar to the education and clothing 
rule-perceivers, households that perceived a food rule had more children and larger households 
overall. Since education, clothing, and food are the rule categories that explicitly relate to 
children, it makes sense that households with more children would be more apt to perceive those 
“rules.” These households may be receiving different messaging about the program than 
households without children. 
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Table 4.7: Baseline balance for key hhld characteristics (by perceived investment condition) in 
Malawi 




P-value of diff. 
Salima district 0.48 0.42 0.58 0.00 
Main respondent literate 0.20 0.17 0.24 0.00 
Main respondent female 0.83 0.86 0.77 0.00 
Main respondent age 58.16 57.54 59.08 0.13 
Main respondent widow 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.64 
Household members 0-5 years 0.67 0.72 0.58 0.00 
Household members 6-11 years 1.16 1.19 1.12 0.17 
Household members 12-17 years 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.79 
Household members 18-65 years 1.18 1.21 1.12 0.06 
Numbers of persons in household 4.57 4.65 4.44 0.08 
     
Observations 1,609 964 645  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 
The Salima district pattern held for investment rule-perceivers, too. There was no 
difference in whether the household head was literate for overall rule-perceiving households 
versus non-rule-perceiving households, or for education-rule-perceiving households versus their 
counterparts. However, recipients who perceived an investment rule were 7 percentage points 
more likely to be literate, a highly significant difference considering the overall literacy rate for 
the treatment group is 20%. It is possible that more literate household heads are more likely to 
understand the value of using the transfer money on investments. With an average of 82%, the 
vast majority of household heads in the treatment group were female. However, recipients who 
perceived an investment rule were more likely to be male-headed, with only 77% of those 
households led by a woman. At baseline, 55.21% of male household heads in the treatment group 
had ever attended school, while only 28.87% of female household heads had, which explains the 
gender disparity in literacy. Investment rule-perceivers were just as likely to be widows as 
recipients who did not perceive an investment rule. Households that perceived an investment rule 
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also had fewer children under five. Households without children were not receiving the 
“education bonus,” nor were they hearing the messaging from social workers that transfer money 
should be spent on children’s education. Therefore, it follows that households with fewer 
children were more likely to perceive an investment rule, the only rule category not relating to 
children’s wellbeing. Another potential explanation for these trends in investment rule-
perceiving households in Malawi is that households with fewer children and fewer people overall 
may have had more flexibility in their budgets and thus a greater propensity to use their transfer 
cash on investments, rather than school fees, food, or clothing.   
 
Sources of confusion and perception of enforcement in Malawi 
 Although the effects, not the causes, of rule perception are the focus of this thesis, it is 
still worthwhile to explore why three of four beneficiaries in Malawi perceived the SCTP to have 
rules when in reality, the program is supposed to be unconditional. The data used in this thesis 
provide some insight into the sources of rule perception and the perceptions beneficiaries have 
about enforcement of these “rules.” However, it must be emphasized that these data by 
themselves cannot tell the full story of causality; an additional qualitative analysis would be 
necessary to fully uncover why so many people perceive rules.  
 After rule-perceiving beneficiaries list the rules they believe the program to have, the 
survey asked them to describe where they learned about those rules. Specifically, the 
questionnaire asked: “Did someone tell you that there are specific rules of the SCT programme? 
If so who?” Respondents were able to list as many sources as they liked. Table 4.8 below records 
the responses.  
 
 
IS PERCEPTION REALITY?   Lundeen  68 
Table 4.8: Sources of rule perception in Malawi 
Who told you about rules? Frequency Proportion 
SCT Programme representative (i.e. at community 
awareness session) 748 0.466 
Flyer 10 0.006 
Payment point 378 0.236 
Neighbour/Friend 32 0.020 
Village Elder 47 0.029 
Village Chief 65 0.041 
Another beneficiary 95 0.059 
CSSC Member 190 0.118 
Relative/Family member 9 0.006 
No one told me 28 0.017 
Don't remember 2 0.001 
Other  0 0 
Total 1,604  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 
According to these data, the vast majority of rule confusion came from program 
administrators of the SCTP. Together, “programme representative” and “payment point” 
constituted 70.2% of the sources of rule perception listed. This finding demonstrates that the 
confusion surrounding the program’s conditionality is somehow due to the words or actions of 
the people running the program.  
Next, rule-perceiving beneficiaries were asked: “What do you think would happen to a 
cash transfer household if they did not follow all of the rules?” Again, they could list as many 
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Table 4.9: Penalty perception in Malawi 
What do you think will happen to cash transfer households if they do 
not follow the rules? 
Frequency Proportion 
Nothing 204 0.163 
Kicked out of the programme 891 0.712 
Go to jail 52 0.042 
A penalty fine will be deducted from the next payment 57 0.046 
Don't know 45 0.036 
Other (Reported to SCT representative) 1 0.001 
Total 1,250  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 
 The overwhelming majority of respondents believed the “rules” of the program to be 
conditional in the “strong” or “hard” sense; of all possible penalties listed, 71.2% were getting 
“kicked out of the programme.” Only 16.3% of penalties listed were “nothing,” or no penalty.  
Finally, rule-perceiving beneficiaries were asked: “Is anyone checking to see if cash 
transfer families are following the rules?” Table 4.10 below records the responses. 
 
Table 4.10: Enforcement perception in Malawi  
Is anyone checking? Frequency Proportion 
Yes 632 0.532 
No 535 0.450 
Don't know 21 0.018 
Total 1,188  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 
 Although Table 4.9 demonstrates that the majority of rule-perceivers thought the rules 
had strong conditions attached to them, Table 4.10 shows that only 53.2% of rule-perceivers 
thought the conditions would actually be monitored. 
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Effects of rule perception on outcomes in Malawi 
Table 4.11: Means of outcome variables in Malawi 
 
VARIABLES Mean 
Child has 2 sets of clothes (N=3,533) 0.738 
(99.72) 
Child has blanket (N=3,533) 0.353 
(43.87) 
Child has shoes (N=3,533) 0.191 
(28.88) 
Child has all three: change of clothes, blanket, shoes (N=3,533) 0.112 
(21.09) 
Child has any one: change of clothes, blanket, shoes (N=3,533) 0.792 
(115.96) 
TLU ownership (N=1,342) 0.038 
(8.57) 
Own goat, sheep, or chicken (N=1,342) 0.264 
(21.92) 
Total agricultural expenditures (N=1,342) 199.642 
(10.95) 
Total educational expenditure per child (N=1,342) 424.218 
(23.22) 
Child receives 3+ meals/day (N=882) 0.349 
(21.74) 
Data source: The Transfer Project.  
Note: Samples include follow-up values for the treatment group only. The discrepancy in sample sizes across 
outcomes is due to household-level datasets being used to test some outcomes and individual-level datasets being 
used to test others. Educational expenditure is estimated only for households with children, and it is a household-
level outcome. Investment outcomes are measured at the household level. Clothing and food outcomes are measured 
at the individual level, leading to a larger sample for clothing outcomes. Not all households answered the “child 
receives 3+ meals/day” question, which is why the sample size is lower.  
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Table 4.12: Effects of food, education, and investment “rule” perception in Malawi 









Food rule perceived 
(𝐸𝑞𝑢	1, 𝛽M) 
 
 0.071 (2.08)    








Effect of perceiving food rule 
on child receiving 3+ 
meals/day (𝐸𝑞𝑢	1, 𝛽O) 
 
 0.022 (0.46)    
Educational expenditure 
per child (𝐸𝑞𝑢	2, 𝛽M) 
 
0.001 
(0.71)     




(3.51)     
Effect of perceiving food rule 
on educational expenditure 
𝐸𝑞𝑢	2, 𝛽O  
 
-0.001 
(-0.73)     
Investment rule perceived 
(𝐸𝑞𝑢	1, 𝛽M; 	𝐸𝑞𝑢	2, 𝛽N) 
 





Effect of perceiving 
investment 
rule on livestock ownership 
(𝐸𝑞𝑢	1, 𝛽O) 
 





per person (𝐸𝑞𝑢	2, 𝛽M) 
 
    0.003 (2.15) 
Effect of perceiving 
investment 
rule on agricultural input 
expenditures (𝐸𝑞𝑢	2, 𝛽O) 












Observations 1,287 1,672 2,627 2,629 1,285 
R-squared 0.041 0.037 0.056 0.149 0.019 
Data source: The Transfer Project.  
Note: Results above describe the estimates from both Equation (1) and Equation (2) as specified in Chapter Three. 
In parentheses are the t-statistics. The MPC analysis in Equation (2) measures impacts on expenditure outcomes by 
considering only the values at the follow-up evaluation, which is why the number of observations is lower for 
columns 1 and 5. The number of observations is also lower in column 2, but that is because only households with 
young children are considered in this question on the survey.  
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Results from Table 4.12 indicate that perception of an “education rule” did not impact per 
capita educational expenditures; the relevant coefficient is -0.001 in column 1. Likewise, the 
children of recipients who perceived a “food rule” were just as likely to receive three or more 
meals a day as children of recipients who did not perceive a “food rule” (coefficient estimate is 
0.022 in column 2). The investment category followed the same pattern of no impact, showing 
that regardless of “investment rule” perception, SCTP recipients were equally likely to own the 
same number of Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) and a sheep, goat, or chicken, at endline 
(coefficient estimates are 0.025 and 0.033 in columns 3 and 4, respectively). Similarly, 
perception of an investment rule did not impact total agricultural expenditures (the relevant 
coefficient is -0.002 in column 5). 
 
Table 4.13: Effect clothing “rule” perception in Malawi 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Two sets of clothes Blanket Shoes All 3 Any 1 












































      
Observations 7,506 7,506 7,506 7,200 7,200 
R-squared 0.092 0.108 0.230 0.208 0.093 
Data source: The Transfer Project 
Note: Results above describe the estimates from Equation (1) as specified in Chapter Three. In parentheses are the t-
statistics.  
 
Perception of a “clothing rule” had no effect on the likelihood of children owning two 
sets of clothes, a blanket, shoes, or any combination of the three. None of the coefficients in the 
third row of table 4.13 are statistically significant. 
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Zambia 
Prevalence of rule perception 
Table 4.14: Prevalence of rule perception in Zambia 
Are there rules? Frequency Proportion of sample 
     
YES 886 0.829 
NO 183 0.171 
   
Observations 1,069 1,069 
Data source: The Transfer Project 
Note: Although 1,260 treatment households are considered in the DID regression analysis and coded as rule-
perceiving or non-rule-perceiving based on their perception (or lack thereof) of specific rules, only 1,069 answered 
the specific question “Are there rules?” 
 
 
In Zambia, after 36 months, 82.9% of recipient households answered “yes” to the 
question “Do you think that families participating in the CGP programme have to follow any 
rules in order to continue receiving payments?” Only 17.1% answered correctly that no, the 
program does not require that participants meet certain requirements before receiving cash. The 
data did not include the number of respondents for “do not know.” The following analysis 
focuses on the 82.9% of recipient households that did perceive at least one rule. Those 
households answered the next question in the survey: “Can you please list the rules that you 
think cash transfer families have to follow?” Each recipient was able to list up to three rules, 
called rule “instances” in this analysis. Table 4.15 below describes the total instances for each 
rule category.  
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Table 4.15: Most common rules perceived in Zambia 
Can you please list the rules that you think cash transfer families have to 
follow? 
Total instances Proportion 
 
Enrolment/Attendance in primary and secondary schools 242 0.116 
Attendance to health facility for immunizations 110 0.053 
Attendance to health facility for growth monitoring 77 0.037 
Attendance to health facility for Vitamin A supplement 15 0.007 
Adequate food and nutrition for children 771 0.371 
 Clean and appropriate clothing for children 606 0.291 
 Obtain under 5 card (health card) 143 0.069 
 Birth certificate for children 38 0.018 
 Other 77 0.037 
Total rules perceived 2,079  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
  
At N=771 instances, or 37.1% of total rule instances, the “food rule” was the most 
commonly perceived rule in Zambia. The second most common rule perceived was the “clothing 
rule” (29.1%), followed by the “education rule” (11.6%). 
 
Conditionality perception by household demographics 
 To test for any patterns across demographic types of households that perceived rules, the 
baseline characteristics of rule-perceiving households and non-rule-perceiving households were 
compared, as shown below in Table 4.16. Only households in the treatment group were tested 
across these characteristics because only treatment households were asked about their perception 
of program rules.  
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Table 4.16: Baseline balance for key hhld characteristics between rule-perceiving and non-rule-
perceiving hhlds in Zambia 
Household characteristic All Treat No rules Rule(s) P-value of diff. 
Kaputa 0.25 0.36 0.21 0.00 
Shangombo 0.29 0.23 0.32 0.00 
Recipient has ever attended school 0.74 0.78 0.73 0.03 
Age of recipient 30.05 31.99 29.23 0.00 
Recipient is a widow 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.06 
Number of people ages 0 – 5 1.88 1.86 1.89 0.52 
Number of people ages 6 – 12 1.27 1.25 1.28 0.72 
Number of people ages 13 – 18 0.60 0.61 0.59 0.69 
Number of people ages 19 – 35 1.36 1.32 1.37 0.32 
Number of people ages 36 – 55 0.54 0.58 0.53 0.22 
Number of people ages 56 – 69 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.00 
Household size 5.76 5.78 5.75 0.80 
     
Observations 1,260 374 886  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 Note that the gender of the household head was not a control variable in Zambia because 
over 99% of households were female-headed. The rest of the control variables were the same as 
Malawi. There are significant geographic differences between rule-perceiving and non-rule 
perceiving households in Zambia, with rule-perceiving households being more likely to live in 
Shangombo district than Kalabo district and less likely to live in Kaputa district than Kalabo. 
This geographic disparity suggests a difference in messaging about the program in different 
districts. On average, household heads who perceived a rule were 5 percentage points less 
educated than those who did not. The age of the household head was significantly different, with 
rule perceivers tending to be more than 2.5 years younger than non-rule perceivers. The age 
makeup of a household in Zambia was not significantly different based on rule perception, 
except for the number of people ages 56-69, but the sample had so few people in that age group 
that the difference is practically insignificant. 
 Beyond the overall categorization of rule-perceiving and non-rule-perceiving households, 
IS PERCEPTION REALITY?   Lundeen  76 
the means of baseline characteristics were also compared for those who perceived rules and those 
who did not within the specific rule categories of education, clothing, and food. Table 4.17 
below describes the difference in baseline demographic characteristics for treatment households 
that perceived an education rule versus households that did not perceive an education rule. 
Tables 4.18 and 4.19 show similar comparisons for clothing and food rules, respectively.  
 
Table 4.17: Baseline balance for key hhld characteristics (by perceived education condition) in 
Zambia 
Household characteristic All Treat No educ 
rule 
Educ rule P-value of diff. 
Kaputa 0.25 0.23 0.33 0.00 
Shangombo 0.29 0.32 0.18 0.00 
Recipient has ever attended school 0.74 0.74 0.78 0.17 
Age of recipient 30.05 30.09 29.87 0.75 
Recipient is a widow 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.73 
Number of people ages 0 - 5 1.88 1.86 1.98 0.04 
Number of people ages 6 - 12 1.27 1.24 1.38 0.11 
Number of people ages 13 - 18 0.60 0.60 0.58 0.68 
Number of people ages 19 - 35 1.36 1.35 1.37 0.75 
Number of people ages 36 - 55 0.54 0.54 0.58 0.47 
Number of people ages 56 - 69 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.14 
Household size 5.76 5.71 5.96 0.12 
     
Observations 1,260 1,027 233  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
When the means at baseline were compared considering the “education rule” specifically, 
the perceivers and non-perceivers were less similar than the overall rule-perceiving households 
and non-rule-perceiving households. Similar to Table 4.16 earlier, Table 4.17 above shows 
geographic disparities in rule perception; however, the trends are reversed—households that 
perceived an education rule were more likely to live in Kaputa than Kalabo, even though overall, 
rule-perceiving households were more likely to live in Shangombo than Kalabo. No other 
household characteristics differed significantly among those that perceived an education rule 
versus those that did not. 
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Table 4.18: Baseline balance for key hhld characteristics (by perceived clothing condition) in 
Zambia 




P-value of diff. 
Kaputa 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.83 
Shangombo 0.29 0.38 0.20 0.00 
Recipient has ever attended school 0.74 0.72 0.77 0.10 
Age of recipient 30.05 30.72 29.31 0.01 
Recipient is a widow 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.25 
Number of people ages 0 - 5 1.88 1.86 1.91 0.23 
Number of people ages 6 - 12 1.27 1.30 1.24 0.32 
Number of people ages 13 - 18 0.60 0.63 0.57 0.18 
Number of people ages 19 - 35 1.36 1.38 1.33 0.35 
Number of people ages 36 - 55 0.54 0.56 0.53 0.58 
Number of people ages 56 - 69 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.04 
Household size 5.76 5.84 5.66 0.15 
     
Observations 1,260 661 599  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 
 Compared to Kalabo district, households that perceived a clothing rule were less likely to 
live in Shangombo district but equally likely to live in Kaputa district. Household heads who 
perceived a clothing rule tended to be about 0.5 years younger than those who did not. Besides 
the number of people ages 56-69 living in a household being slightly lower in clothing rule-
perceiving households, no other characteristics marked households that perceived a clothing rule 
to be significantly different than households that did not.  
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Table 4.19: Baseline balance for key hhld characteristics (by perceived food condition) in 
Zambia 
Household characteristic All Treat No food 
rule 
Food rule P-value of diff. 
Kaputa 0.25 0.29 0.23 0.03 
Shangombo 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.81 
Recipient has ever attended school 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.56 
Age of recipient 30.05 30.99 29.44 0.01 
Recipient is a widow 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.11 
Number of people ages 0 - 5 1.88 1.87 1.89 0.55 
Number of people ages 6 - 12 1.27 1.23 1.29 0.40 
Number of people ages 13 - 18 0.60 0.59 0.61 0.67 
Number of people ages 19 - 35 1.36 1.34 1.37 0.57 
Number of people ages 36 - 55 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.94 
Number of people ages 56 - 69 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.04 
Household size 5.76 5.70 5.80 0.43 
     
Observations 1,260 494 766  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 
 Compared to Kalabo district, households that perceived a clothing rule were less likely to 
live in Kaputa district but equally likely to live in Shangombo district. The opposite trend 
occurred for the clothing rule, suggesting that there is a geographic difference in messaging not 
just about whether the CGP has rules, but about what forms those rules take. Similar to clothing 
rule-perceivers, household heads who perceived a food rule were younger than those who did 
not, by about 1.5 years on average. Also similar to the clothing rule-perceivers, households that 
perceived a food rule had fewer members aged 56-59. 
In Malawi, rule-perceivers were also asked to list where or from whom they learned 
about the rules and explain whether they think the rules will be enforced. In Zambia, there were 
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Effects of rule perception on outcomes in Zambia 
 
Table 4.20: Means of outcome variables in Zambia 
 
VARIABLES Mean 
Child has all three: shoes, blanket, two sets of clothes (N=2,556) 
0.117 
(18.40) 
Child has shoes (N=2,556) 
0.155 
(21.64) 
Child has blanket (N=2,556) 
0.558 
(56.78) 
Child has two sets of clothes 
0.644 
(67.92) 
Child has any one: shoes, blanket, two sets of clothes (N=2,556) 
0.785 
(96.53) 
Clothing expenditure per person 
1.048 
(38.32) 
Educational expenditure per child (N=1,256) 
1.076 
(10.14) 
IYCF feeding index (N=747) 
0.281 
(17.08) 
Food expenditure per person per (N=747) 
30.461 
(32.46) 
Data source: The Transfer Project.  
Note: Samples include follow-up values for the treatment group only. The discrepancy in sample sizes across 
outcomes is due to household-level datasets being used to test some outcomes and individual-level datasets being 
used to test others. Educational expenditure is estimated only for households with children, and it is a household-
level outcome. Investment outcomes are measured at the household level. Clothing and food outcomes are measured 
at the individual level, leading to a larger sample for clothing outcomes. Only households with infants and very 
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Table 4.21: Effects of food and education “rule” perception in Zambia 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Educational expenditures IYCF index Food expenditures 
        
Total educational expenditures  
per child (𝐸𝑞𝑢	2, 𝛽M) 
0.051 
(6.83)   
Education rule perceived	(𝐸𝑞𝑢	2, 𝛽N) 
2.599 
(2.25)   
Effect of perceiving education rule 
on educational expenditures (𝐸𝑞𝑢	2, 𝛽O) 
-0.039 
(-2.63)   





Time 	(𝐸𝑞𝑢	1, 𝛽N)  
0.121 
(2.51)  
Effect of perceiving food rule  
on feeding index (𝐸𝑞𝑢	1, 𝛽O)  
0.126 
(2.12)  
Food expenditures per person (𝐸𝑞𝑢	2, 𝛽M)   
0.660 
(20.99) 
Effect of perceiving food rule 










Observations 1,210 1,189 1,183 
R-squared 0.102 0.062 0.500 
Data source: The Transfer Project 
Note: Results above describe the estimates from both Equation (1) and Equation (2) as specified in Chapter Three. 
In parentheses are the t-statistics.  
 
 
Perception of an “education rule” led to a significant decline in per capita educational 
expenditures of ZMW 0.039 per month, as seen in column 1. Compared to a mean of ZMW 
1.076, this result has no practical significance. As seen in column 2, recipients who perceived the 
CGP to have a “food rule” were 12.6 percentage points more likely to meet the World Health 
Organization’s (WHO) Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) requirements for their child. The 
IYCF practices include frequency and duration of breastfeeding for infants and introduction to 
diverse, solid foods for young children (World Health Organization, 2010). This effect can be 
considered an internalization of the “food rule” by the recipients, who then fed their infants more 
often. Perception of a “food rule” also led to an unexpected decline in per capita food 
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expenditures of ZMW 0.150 per month (as seen in column 3); however, compared to a mean of 
ZMW 30.461, this result’s practical significance is zero.  
 
Table 4.22: Effect of clothing rule perception on outcomes in Zambia 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All 3 Shoes Blanket Two sets Any 1 
Per capita  
clothing 
expenditures 
              
Clothing rule perceived 
























Effect of perceiving  












per person (𝐸𝑞𝑢	2, 𝛽M)      
0.020 
(28.92) 
Effect of perceiving  
clothing rule on clothing 
expenditures (𝐸𝑞𝑢	2, 𝛽O)      
-0.003 
(-3.44) 











Observations 15,627 4,708 5,618 5,591 15,627 15,407 
R-squared 0.104 0.696 0.332 0.262 0.063 0.136 
Data source: The Transfer Project 
Note: Results above describe the estimates from both Equation (1) and Equation (2) as specified in Chapter Three. 
In parentheses are the t-statistics.  
 
Children with a parent who perceived the CGP to include a “clothing rule” were 6.5 
percentage points less likely to own two sets of clothing (column 4), and 6.2 percentage points 
less likely to own a blanket (column 3). There was no impact of “clothing rule” perception on 
ownership of shoes (column 2), on the likelihood of owning all three items (column 1), or the 
likelihood of owning any one of the items (column 5). As seen in column 6, perception of a 
“clothing rule” led to a decline in per capita clothing expenditures of ZMW 0.003 per month, 
which is practically zero impact when compared to a mean of ZMW 1.048.   
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Zimbabwe 
Prevalence of rule perception 
Table 4.23: Prevalence of rule perception in Zimbabwe 
Are there rules? Frequency Proportion of sample 
    
YES 543 0.374 
  (29.46) 
NO 539 0.372 
  (29.29) 
Don't know 368 0.254 
  (22.21) 
   
Observations 1,450  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
Note: Although 1,725 treatment households were considered in the analysis and coded as rule-perceiving or non-
rule-perceiving based on their perception (or lack thereof) of specific rules, only 1,450 answered the specific 
question “Are there rules?” 
 
 
In Zimbabwe, at the 48-month endline, 37.4% of recipient households answered “yes” to 
the question “Do you think that families participating in the SCT programme have to follow any 
rules in order to continue receiving payments?” An additional 25.4% were unsure whether the 
program was conditional. Just over a third of recipients, at 37.2%, answered correctly that no, the 
program does not require that participants meet certain requirements before receiving cash. This 
thesis focuses on the 37.4% of recipient households that did perceive at least one rule. The 
proportion of rule-perceiving households was much lower in Zimbabwe (37.4%) than in Malawi 
(74.6%) or Zambia (82.9%).  
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Table 4.24: Most common rules perceived in Zimbabwe 
Can you please list the rules that you think cash transfer families have to follow? Total instances Proportion 
Enrolment/attendance in primary school 387 0.153 
Enrolment/attendance in secondary school 292 0.115 
Purchase of school supplies (books, uniform, etc) 412 0.162 
Attendance to health facility for immunization/Obtain under 5 health card 36 0.014 
Attendance to health facility for growth monitoring 36 0.014 
Adequate food and nutrition for children 497 0.196 
Clean and appropriate clothing for children 170 0.067 
Birth certificate for children 100 0.039 
Invest in farm or non-farm business 438 0.173 
Pay off debt 50 0.020 
Other 118 0.047 
Total rules perceived 2,536  
Don't know 56  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
At N=1,091 instances, or 43.0% of total rule instances, the “education rule” was the most 
commonly perceived rule in Zimbabwe. The second most common rule perceived was the “food 
rule (19.6%),” but there were not available data on food outcomes, so this rule category was 
excluded from the analysis. The third most common rule perceived was the “investment rule” 
(17.3%), followed by the “clothing rule.”  
 
Conditionality perception by household demographics 
 To test for any patterns across demographic types of households that perceived rules, the 
baseline characteristics were compared between rule-perceiving households and non-rule-
perceiving households, as shown below in Table 4.25. Only households in the treatment group 
were tested across these characteristics because only treatment households were asked about 
their perception of program rules.  
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Table 4.25: Baseline balance for key hhld characteristics (between rule-perceiving and non-rule-
perceiving hhlds) in Zimbabwe	
Household characteristic All Treat No rule Rule(s) P-value of diff. 
Mashona province  0.30 0.26 0.28 0.63 
Masvingo province 0.30 0.13 0.50 0.00 
Female respondent  0.69 0.73 0.69 0.22 
Age of respondent (years) 56.28 57.98 55.42 0.03 
Whether respondent ever attended school 0.53 0.46 0.56 0.00 
Respondent widowed 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.36 
Household size 5.00 4.77 5.48 0.00 
Household members 0-5 years 0.73 0.69 0.87 0.00 
Household members 6-12 years 1.34 1.30 1.52 0.00 
Household members 13-18 years 0.94 0.89 1.06 0.01 
Household members 19-35 years 0.61 0.52 0.63 0.04 
Household members 36-55 years 0.46 0.43 0.48 0.20 
Household members 56-69 years 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.46 
     
Observations 1,082 543 539  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 
 Overall, rule-perceivers in Zimbabwe and non-rule-perceivers were statistically 
equivalent at baseline in regards to geographic location, the gender of the household head, and 
the marital status of the household head. However, household heads who perceived a rule tended 
to be about 2.5 years younger than those who didn’t perceived a rule and 10 percentage points 
more likely to have ever attended school. Household size also varied significantly; rule-
perceiving households tended to be larger (by 0.71 people, on average) with more children under 
18 than non-rule-perceiving households. 
Beyond the overall categorization of rule-perceiving and non-rule-perceiving households, 
the means at baseline were also compared independently for education rule-perceivers (Table 
4.26), clothing rule-perceivers (Table 4.27), and investment rule-perceivers (Table 4.28). 
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Table 4.26: Baseline balance for key hhld characteristics (by perceived education condition) in 
Zimbabwe 
Household characteristic All Treat No educ 
rule 
Educ rule P-value of diff. 
Mashona province  0.30 0.31 0.26 0.04 
Masvingo province 0.30 0.22 0.53 0.00 
Female respondent  0.69 0.68 0.72 0.18 
Age of respondent (years) 56.28 56.61 55.31 0.23 
Whether respondent ever attended 
school 
0.53 0.52 0.58 0.03 
Respondent widowed 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.38 
Household size 5.00 4.85 5.47 0.00 
Household members 0-5 years 0.73 0.68 0.90 0.00 
Household members 6-12 years 1.34 1.28 1.54 0.00 
Household members 13-18 years 0.94 0.90 1.04 0.01 
Household members 19-35 years 0.61 0.60 0.62 0.72 
Household members 36-55 years 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.52 
Household members 56-69 years 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.43 
     
Observations 1,725 1,291 434  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 The households that specifically perceived an education rule were less likely to live in 
Mashona province and more likely to live in Masvingo province than Matabele province, 
suggesting that education-specific messaging occurred in Masvingo. Recipients who perceived 
an education rule were 6 percentage points more likely to have ever attended school than 
recipients who did not perceive an education rule. A possible explanation for this difference is 
that household heads who are educated may place more value on their children’s education and 
therefore be more susceptible to perceiving and internalizing an “education rule.” Households 
that perceived an education rule were also larger with more children, either because parents with 
children are more likely to perceive a rule relating to their child’s wellbeing, or because these 
parents were told that there were education conditions. 
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Table 4.27: Baseline balance for key hhld characteristics (by perceived clothing condition) in 
Zimbabwe 




P-value of diff. 
Mashona province  0.30 0.30 0.17 0.20 
Masvingo province 0.30 0.29 0.52 0.02 
Female respondent  0.69 0.69 0.83 0.16 
Age of respondent (years) 56.28 56.30 55.30 0.81 
Whether respondent ever attended 
school 
0.53 0.53 0.48 0.60 
Respondent widowed 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.72 
Household size 5.00 5.01 4.78 0.70 
Household members 0-5 years 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.85 
Household members 6-12 years 1.34 1.34 1.43 0.72 
Household members 13-18 years 0.94 0.94 0.83 0.60 
Household members 19-35 years 0.61 0.61 0.48 0.49 
Household members 36-55 years 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.89 
Household members 56-69 years 0.46 0.46 0.43 0.86 
     
Observations 1,725 1,702 23  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 As seen in Table 4.27 above, only 23 households perceived a clothing rule. Because there 
were not at least 30 observations in the clothing-rule-perceiver sample, the clothing category was 
then eliminated from the remaining analysis of the HSCT in Zimbabwe. 
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Table 4.28: Baseline balance for key hhld characteristics (by perceived investment condition) in 
Zimbabwe 




P-value of diff. 
Mashona province  0.30 0.29 0.33 0.36 
Masvingo province 0.30 0.29 0.37 0.03 
Female respondent  0.69 0.69 0.66 0.38 
Age of respondent (years) 56.28 56.45 54.58 0.25 
Whether respondent ever attended 
school 
0.53 0.53 0.55 0.62 
Respondent widowed 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.79 
Household size 5.00 4.96 5.47 0.03 
Household members 0-5 years 0.73 0.72 0.83 0.17 
Household members 6-12 years 1.34 1.32 1.55 0.03 
Household members 13-18 years 0.94 0.92 1.08 0.08 
Household members 19-35 years 0.61 0.61 0.58 0.73 
Household members 36-55 years 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.41 
Household members 56-69 years 0.46 0.45 0.51 0.23 
     
Observations 1,725 1,569 156  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 
 Similar to the education rule-perceivers, investment rule-perceivers were more likely to 
live in Masvingo. Otherwise, households in Zimbabwe that perceived an investment rule had 
similar demographic characteristics to households that didn’t perceive an investment rule, except 
that the investment rule-perceivers followed the trend of the overall rule-perceivers in being 
larger and having more children ages 6-12. 
 
Sources of confusion and perception of enforcement in Zimbabwe 
 In the quantitative analysis of Malawi, the reasoning behind the inclusion of perception 
“causality” data was explained. In this section, data analogous to those in Malawi are explored 
for Zimbabwe’s HSCT program. Recall that more than one in three beneficiaries in Zimbabwe 
perceived the HSCT to have rules when in reality, the program is supposed to be unconditional.  
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After rule-perceiving beneficiaries list the rules they believe the program to have, the survey 
asked them to describe where they learned about those rules. Specifically, the questionnaire 
asked: “How did you learn about the rules of the HSCT programme? Table 4.29 below records 
the responses.  
 
Table 4.29: Sources of rule perception in Zimbabwe 
How did you learn about rules? Frequency Proportion 
HSCT programme representative (i.e. at community awareness session) 326 0.525 
Flyer 2 0.003 
Payment point 234 0.377 
Village elder 6 0.010 
Village chief 2 0.003 
Another beneficiary 18 0.029 
Ward member 19 0.031 
Relative/family member 9 0.014 
Other 5 0.008 
Total 621  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 
According to these data, nearly all rule confusion can be attributed to program 
administrators of the SCTP. Together, “programme representative” and “payment point” 
comprise 90.2% of the sources of rule perception listed. This finding demonstrates that the 
confusion surrounding the program’s conditionality was due to the words or actions of the people 
running the program.  
Next, rule-perceiving beneficiaries were asked: “What will happen to a cash transfer 
family if they do not follow all of the rules?” Table 4.30 below records the responses. 
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Table 4.30: Penalty perception in Zimbabwe 
What will happen if a cash transfer family doesn't follow rules? Frequency Proportion 
Nothing 2 0.004 
Kicked out of the programme 213 0.395 
Go to jail 26 0.048 
A penalty fine will be deducted from the next payment 3 0.006 
Don't know 289 0.536 
Other 6 0.011 
Total 539  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 
Just over half of respondents responded with uncertainty about possible penalties for 
breaking the rules they perceived. The most common penalty listed, at 39.5% of the sample, was 
“kicked out of the programme.” Thus, of beneficiaries who thought they knew how the “rules” 
would be enforced, most considered the program to have “strong” or “hard” conditionality.  
Finally, rule-perceiving beneficiaries were asked: “Is anyone checking to see if cash 
transfer families are following the rules?” Table 4.31 below records the responses. 
 
Table 4.31: Enforcement perception in Zimbabwe 
Is anyone checking? Frequency Proportion 
Yes 255 0.473 
No 135 0.250 
Don't know 149 0.276 
Total 539  
Data source: The Transfer Project 
 
Although Table 4.30 demonstrated that the majority of rule-perceivers thought the rules 
had strong conditions attached to them, Table 4.31 shows that only 47.3% of rule-perceivers 
thought the conditions would actually be monitored. 
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Effects of rule perception on outcomes in Zimbabwe 
 
Table 4.32: Means of outcome variables in Zimbabwe 
VARIABLES Mean 
TLU ownership (N=1,725) 
1.221 
(26.80) 
Own any livestock (N=1,725) 
0.768 
(75.45) 
Total expenditure on agricultural inputs (N=1,725) 
2.687 
(8.82) 
Own six key assets (N=1,725) 
2.662 
(59.41) 
Child aged 5-12 is enrolled in school (N=2,485) 
0.874 
(131.53) 
Child aged 13-17 is enrolled in school (N=1,493) 
0.728 
(63.20) 
Educational expenditure per child (N=8,158) 
2.127 
(48.10) 
Data source: The Transfer Project 
Note: Samples include follow-up values for the treatment group only. The discrepancy in sample sizes across 
outcomes is due to household-level datasets being used to test some outcomes and individual-level datasets being 
used to test others. Educational expenditure is estimated only for households with children, and it is an individual-
level outcome. Investment outcomes are measured at the household level.  
 
Table 4.33: Effect of education rule perception on education expenditure in Zimbabwe 
 








        
Education rule perceived 












Effect of perceiving education 






per child 	(𝐸𝑞𝑢	2, 𝛽M)   
0.019 
(15.70) 
Effect of perceiving education 
rule on educational expenditures 










Observations 4,949 3,162 13,470 
R-squared 0.021 0.013 0.070 
Data source: The Transfer Project 
Note: Results above describe the estimates from both Equation (1) and Equation (2) as specified in Chapter Three. 
In parentheses are the t-statistics. Columns 1 and 2 describe rates of school enrollment by age. 
IS PERCEPTION REALITY?   Lundeen  91 
Perception that the HSCT had an “education rule” led recipients to spend $0.03 USD 
more per capita on education (column 3). Compared to mean educational expenditures of $2.13 
per capita each month, this effect represents an increase of just 1.4% and therefore has little 
practical significance, despite is statistical significance.  
 
Table 4.34: Effect of investment rule perception on outcomes in Zimbabwe 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES TLU Livestock Key assets 
Agricultural  
input expenditures 
          
Investment rule perceived 	 


















Effect of perceiving investment 









Agricultural input expenditures 
per person 	(𝐸𝑞𝑢	2, 𝛽M)    
0.051 
(6.85) 
Effect of perceiving investment 












Observations 3,449 3,449 3,449 1,724 
R-squared 0.129 0.102 0.239 0.151 
Data source: The Transfer Project 
Note: Results above describe the estimates from both Equation (1) and Equation (2) as specified in Chapter Three. 
In parentheses are the t-statistics. The MPC analysis in Equation (2) measures impacts on expenditure outcomes by 
considering only the follow-up, which is why the number of observations is lower for column 4 than the other 
columns, which have twice as many observations because they also consider the baseline values. 
 
Perception that the HSCT had an “investment rule” had no impact on livestock 
ownership, asset ownership, or agricultural input expenditures. None of the estimates for 𝛽O	in 
Table 4.34 are statistically significant.  
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Chapter Five: Application of Normative Framework 
 
Chapter Two explored the ethical objections against hard, or strong, conditionality. This 
chapter revisits those objections in the context of perceived conditionality. The chapter will 
conclude with an application of those objections to the three cash transfer programs analyzed in 
Chapter Four: the Social Cash Transfer in Malawi, the Child Grant Programme in Zambia, and 
the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer in Zimbabwe. Each program will be considered as a case 
study in which the normative implications of conditionality can be examined, using the 
Normative Spectrum of Conditionality developed earlier (see Appendix B). This chapter 
explores the following questions: 
• Is there an ethical difference between perceived and hard conditionality and therefore a 
moral reason to favor one over another? 
 
Application of objections to perceived conditions 
In Chapter Two, it was determined that CT programs do not fit neatly within only WSP 
or PTP but must be considered individually. However, it was suggested that (strongly) 
conditional CT programs often fit the definition of Parent-Targeted Paternalism more closely, as 
opposed to the more general Welfare State Paternalism. The conditions attached to CCTs often 
involve child welfare: school enrollment, for example. Recall that PTP is different from WSP in 
that a driving motivation for implementing the policy is to promote the welfare of recipient’s 
children. Policies that align with WSP are motivated by or express a negative judgment about the 
recipients’ abilities to make decisions for their own wellbeing, but policies that align with PTP 
express a negative judgement about the recipients’ ability to make decisions promoting their 
child’s welfare. 
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Recall that, according to MacKay (2019b: 18-20), the pro tanto wrongness of hard PTP 
depends on four factors:  
1. “Number of people targeted for whom the policy is ends paternalism” 
2. “Degree of singling-out” 
3. “Number of people targeted who oppose the policy” 
4. “Degree of autonomy infringement” 
In a strongly conditional cash transfer program, which this thesis hypothetically refers to 
as a sCCT, the first factor above would encompass everyone in the program; the hypothetical 
sCCT would operate as ends paternalism for 100% of program recipients. The sCCT would 
enforce its conditions on every single recipient, thus requiring behavioral compliance in order to 
receive cash. Recall that “ends paternalism,” involves welfare policies imposing goals or values 
onto their recipients, whereas “means paternalism” involves policies that help people to achieve 
their own preconceived goals or values (MacKay 2019a: 19).  Thus, the requirement of 
behavioral compliance represents ends paternalism. 
In the case of perceived conditionality, the number of recipients for which the program 
operated as ends paternalism would depend on how many recipients altered their behavior in 
accordance with rules they perceived. The second factor, “singling-out,” applies similarly to 
softly conditional programs and strongly conditional programs because both target similarly low-
income and vulnerable populations. There is no de jure singling-out in either softly or strongly 
conditional programs. However, within a CT’s targeted population, it is possible that certain 
beneficiaries are “singled out” in comparison to other beneficiaries. In the case of perceived 
conditionality, this phenomenon would manifest as de facto singling-out if certain demographic 
types of beneficiaries received disproportionate messaging about program rules.  
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This thesis lacks access to data that could capture the third factor above, “number of 
people targeted who oppose the policy.” Given the general popularity of CT programs, it can be 
grossly assumed that this objection does not apply to softly conditional or unconditional 
programs. The fourth factor, degree of autonomy infringement, can be measured in accordance to 
whether recipients change their marginal propensity to consume an item based on their 
perception that the CT program is requiring its consumption. If they do, it can be concluded that 
their autonomy in making expenditure decisions has been infringed upon.  
Pérez-Muñoz (2017: 445-446) outlines six objections against conditions, listed in Chapter 
Two. Five of the objections regard quality of program administration, which is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to analyze, given lack of data. However, Pérez-Muñoz’s first objection against 
strongly conditional CCTs remains interesting from an ethical standpoint:  
1. Conditions may increase the burden on already vulnerable populations by 
excluding needy households that cannot comply with the requirements from 
receiving cash aid. At the extreme, imposing conditional policies may be worse 
than the status quo (pp. 445-446). 
Recall that Pérez-Muñoz references Standing (2011) on the “security-difference 
principle,” in which Standing states that redistributive policies are just only if they reduce the 
insecurity of the least secure groups. Standing also employs the “Paternalist Test Principle,” 
which states that to be considered just, redistributive policies must not impose greater restrictions 
on “less free” groups in society than the restrictions imposed on “more free” groups (Pérez-
Muñoz, 2017: 449). According to Standing, CCTs fail this principle by restricting the ultra-
poor’s access to cash transfer funds by requiring them to meet conditions before receiving the 
money (Pérez-Muñoz, 2017: 449). According to Standing, CCTs do not satisfy this principle 
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because they complicate the process to receive benefits. This thesis objects to Standing’s view as 
overly harsh. Both may be true—a redistributive policy could reduce financial security of low-
income populations while also complicating the process to receive those benefits. In the case of 
CCTs (when rules are actually monitored and enforced, that is), it is true that the process to 
receive cash includes complications of meeting certain requirements. In the case of nominally 
unconditional cash transfer programs, however, regardless of whether those programs include 
soft or perceived conditions, they do not logistically complicate the cash receipt process. 
Therefore, this objection to hard conditionality does not hold for softer forms of conditionality 
because it directly refers to the enforceability of rules, not simply their existence.    
 
 
Cash transfers in Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe as case studies 
Overall, Chapter Four showed that in the CT programs in Malawi and Zambia, perceived 
conditionality existed in that the majority of recipients believed the programs to have rules. In 
Zimbabwe, perceived conditionality still existed, but at a lower rate, with only about one third of 
participants believing the program to have rules. However, these perceptions did not lead to 
different outcomes in the majority of cases. For each of the countries, the primary ethical tests to 
determine the presence of and objections to paternalism in the respective CT programs will be 
the existence of “ends paternalism,” de facto singling-out, and autonomy infringement, as 
determined by this thesis’ quantitative analysis in Chapter Four. If conditions existed and led to 
changed behavior through changing a recipient’s expenditure choices, then recipients were less 
free to use the cash as they choose. Their marginal propensity to consume a given item changed 
as a result of perceived conditions. That result implies a mixture of ends paternalism (the 
program’s goals or values being perceived and internalized by recipients) and autonomy 
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infringement (recipients then making different expenditure choices than if they felt totally free to 
use the cash as they wished). Outcomes that showed rule-perceiving recipients to make 
significantly different decisions than non-rule-perceiving recipients will be weighed against null 
results. De facto singling-out can be approximated by considering the demographic patterns 
across recipients who perceived rules versus those who did not. If certain types of recipients 
were more likely to be confused about the program’s rules, then singling-out may be present, 




In Malawi, the quantitative results regarding behavioral impacts of perceived conditions 
were null. However, Malawi’s SCTP also involved an “education bonus,” which was discussed 
in detail in Chapter Three. The education bonus involved additional funds to motivate school 
enrollment and can be considered a possible incentive. One objection against incentives comes 
from the PTP framework: an incentive presumes that parents would make the wrong choice 
absent a targeted bonus. However, when asked, SCTP program officials said that they recognized 
there were extra costs associated with sending children to school, and so the bonus was aimed to 
offset those additional costs (S. Handa, personal interview, March 6, 2020). The education bonus 
was intended to support schooling and aimed to motivate households to pursue education by 
helping with its financial burden (S. Handa, personal interview, March 6, 2020). Yet, MacKay’s 
PTP-based objection to incentives hinges on the idea of policymakers presuming parents would 
make a “wrong” choice absent an incentive. However, the context of a low-income country like 
Malawi differs in that a child may not attend school because it is simply not affordable to the 
parent, not because the parent has the money for school fees and desires to keep their child out of 
school. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the education bonus was not motivated by a negative 
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judgment on parents but by a realistic assumption about the costs associated with school. 
However, a definitive normative judgment on this matter cannot be made without more 
information about the motivations behind the education bonus. 
In Chapter Four, there were some demographic patterns found that differentiated rule-
perceiving beneficiaries from non-rule-perceiving beneficiaries. Rule-perceiving households in 
Malawi were more likely to live in Salima district than Mangochi district, had more teenagers, 
and had more household members overall. On average, education rule-perceiving households 
were headed by beneficiaries who were younger and less likely to be widowed than households 
that did not perceive an education rule. Households that perceived an education rule were also 
larger than those that did not, with every age group having more members. Clothing rule-
perceiving households were also larger with more children. Recipients who perceived an 
investment rule were more likely to be literate, male, and older than recipients who did not 
perceive an investment rule. Investment rule-perceiving households also tended to be smaller, 
with fewer children under five, than households that did not perceive an investment rule. Overall, 
these demographic discrepancies in who perceived rules suggest that de facto singling-out may 
be present in relation to larger households with more children. However, since the other patterns 
vary across the types of rules perceived, it is difficult to state exactly which population is being 




 In Zambia, the results that were both statistically and practically significant related to 
rules that applied to recipients with children. Therefore, PTP remains the most appropriate 
ethical framework by which to analyze the Child Grant Programme. Recipients who perceived a 
“food rule” were 12.6 percentage points more likely to meet the WHO’s feeding requirements 
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for infants and young children under age two (see Table 4.21). This change reflects ends 
paternalism as part of PTP because IYCF requirements are by definition goals of policymakers. 
Parents who received cash transfers from the CGP perceived a rule that cash receipt was 
contingent upon “adequate food and nutrition for children.” In response, they altered their 
household feeding practices, becoming more likely to meet those WHO requirements.  
Additionally, children with a parent who perceived the CGP to include a “clothing rule” 
were 6.5 percentage points less likely to own two sets of clothing and 6.2 percentage points less 
likely to own a blanket (see Table 4.22). These negative impacts cannot represent PTP because 
the intended result by the policymaker making a “rule” regarding “appropriate clothing” for 
children (or what we could reasonably assume would be the intended result) would be to 
increase ownership of clothing items. No other outcomes of interest in Zambia showed 
differences between rule-perceiving households and non-rule-perceiving households that were 
both statistically and practically significant. Therefore, the Child Grant Programme in Zambia 
can be considered to contain elements of PTP due to the ends paternalism present in the “food 
rule.” However, the vast majority of instances of perceived conditionality led to no behavioral 
change and did not present circumstances of ends paternalism or autonomy infringement. 
Therefore, those null results outweigh the “food rule” result.  
In Chapter Four, there were some demographic patterns found that differentiated rule-
perceiving beneficiaries from non-rule-perceiving beneficiaries. Rule-perceiving households in 
Zambia were more likely to live in Shangombo district than Kalabo district and less likely to live 
in Kaputa district than Kalabo district. The age of the household head was also significantly 
different, with rule perceivers tending to be about 2.5 years younger than non-rule perceivers.  
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When the means at baseline were compared for perception of an “education rule” specifically, 
the geographic trends were reversed; households that perceived an education rule were more 
likely to live in Kaputa district than Kalabo district. Overall, these trends support the possibility 





 As in Zambia, the perceived rules of the HSCT program in Zimbabwe that were 
statistically significant were those that related to children. Therefore, PTP is the most appropriate 
ethical framework for application to the HSCT. Though perception of an education rule led to a 
statistically significant increase in educational expenditures, the effect was close to zero and 
therefore practically insignificant. This result is not strong enough to support the existence of 
ends paternalism within the HSCT. Furthermore, only 37.4% percent of recipients perceived the 
program to have rules. It would be difficult to argue that a program is on the whole paternalistic 
if only a minority of its participants perceived any “rules” imposed on them.  
 In Zimbabwe, household heads who perceived a rule tended to be younger and more 
likely to have ever attended school than those who did not perceive a rule. Rule-perceiving 
households also tended to be larger and have more children under 18 than non-rule-perceiving 
households. When the means at baseline were compared considering perception of an 
“investment rule” specifically, the investment rule-perceivers followed the trend of the overall 
rule-perceivers in being larger and younger households than their non-rule-perceiving 
counterparts. Thus, the overall pattern in Zimbabwe seems to suggest that larger and younger 
households are de facto singled-out by perceived conditionality in the HSCT.  
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Demography of rule perceivers 
 
Another way to ethically analyze these CT programs in Southern Africa is to consider the 
demographic patterns of recipients who perceived rules as a separate ethical factor, rather than as 
a “singling-out” mechanism. Regardless of whether the program as a whole is considered 
paternalistic and/or morally objectionable, there are potential ethical implications to certain 
groups of people being more vulnerable to confusion about a program intended to improve their 
wellbeing. Across the board, larger households with younger household heads and more children 
were more likely to perceive rules. The household head’s schooling also affected their likelihood 
of perceiving a rule; in Malawi, investment rule-perceivers were more likely to be literate; in 
Zambia, education-rule perceivers were less likely to have ever attended school; in Zimbabwe, 
rule-perceivers in general were more likely to have ever attended school. It seems that recipients 
with more children (and therefore larger households, or vice versa) and household heads who are 
younger and more likely to be educated are most susceptible to perceiving conditions in 
programs that otherwise operate as functionally unconditional. These patterns were not drastic, 
however, and therefore no sweeping ethical conclusion should be drawn. However, policymakers 
should keep these groups in mind as they communicate about CT programs in these countries in 
the future, taking extra precaution that certain groups are not disadvantaged to obtaining clear 
information.  
 
Ethics of extant perceived conditionality 
 Even if CT programs are ethically permissible according to the principles of ends 
paternalism, singling-out, and autonomy infringement, it remains to be considered whether there 
is moral wrongness present due to the existence of perceived conditionality, even if there is no 
impact on behavior and no disproportionate impact on certain types of beneficiaries. Suppose the 
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answer is “yes,” wrongness is present due to the existence of perceived conditionality, because 
people are confused and confusion is considered to be “bad” when unnecessarily caused by the 
implementation of a policy. Without more information on the types of paternalistic policy 
(messaging, incentive, etc.) used, the grounds of that wrongness cannot be determined. However, 
two possibilities include that the policy was an attempted paternalistic policy that is wrong 
because the intent was paternalistic but not as wrong as a successful paternalistic policy that 
actually induced behavioral change. Another possible way to explore the grounds of this wrong 
is by appealing to broader ethical notions of the wrongness of deception. That a policymaker 
would lie to people impacted by the policies they are implementing is generally thought to be 
morally impermissible, especially in the case where the population targeted by the policy is 
vulnerable, because then the deception places an even larger psychological burden onto an 
already vulnerable group. Of course, intended deception is much different than 
miscommunication, and more information would be needed to determine why beneficiaries in 
Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe were confused. 
 
Placing perceived conditionality on the spectrum 
 It is now necessary to return to the Normative Spectrum of Conditionality developed in 
Chapter Two. Recall that all positions of conditions on the spectrum are relative; the magnitude 
of the horizontal distances between them is undefined. The position of perceived conditionality 
suggested in Diagram 5.1 is based on the three case studies in this chapter, which determined that 
because cash transfer recipients did not, in the vast majority of instances, change their behavior 
due to ends paternalism or autonomy infringement, the paternalistic elements of the CT programs 
are morally permissible. Therefore, perceived conditionality in these three cases must be 
considered less paternalistic than softly conditional CT programs (like Lesotho), LCTs (like 
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Morocco) or CCTs. Recall that the “light” conditions present on the spectrum (conditioning on 
access and targeting mechanisms) are often present in UCT programs, especially in pilot phases 
before scale-up. As explained in Chapter Three, all three programs studied in this thesis contain 
eligibility and targeting mechanisms; therefore, their added element of perceived conditionality 
places them a notch higher than a UCT in which recipients do not perceive rules. 
 The theory driving this Normative Spectrum of Conditionality is that two CT programs 
may look similar on paper yet operate differently on the ground, or vice versa, that two CT 
programs may look different on paper yet operate similarly on the ground. For example, two 
programs that are called UCTs might operate at different levels of conditionality in practice, with 
one program operating unconditionally except for targeting and eligibility mechanisms, and 
another program operating with perceived conditionality that leads to behavioral change. Or, one 
program may be called a CCT and one may be called a UCT, but perhaps the CCT’s conditions 
are not well enforced and the UCT contains strong messaging that creates implied conditions and 
beneficiaries abide by them. In practice, those nominally different programs may be operating 
quite similarly. The potential gap between how a policy is written and how people experience it 
is what this Normative Spectrum of Conditionality aims to highlight. In an ideal world, the de 
jure and de facto experiences of a policy would not differ. However, until that ideal is achieved, 
it is necessary to study that gap and formulate consistent language to describe the various 
combinations of de jure and de facto CT programs.  
 




Of the objections raised against hard conditionality, the most relevant to perceived 
conditionality are ends paternalism, singling-out, and autonomy infringement. Some objections 
against hard conditionality relate to the targeting and eligibility mechanisms of a program, which 
cannot apply to unconditional or softly conditional programs that remain liberal in their targeting 
and eligibility. Certain types of households do seem to be singled-out by perceived 
conditionality, however: larger households with more children and often, a younger household 
head. Within the three CT programs in Southern Africa studied here, ends paternalism and 
autonomy infringement appear to vary only from program to program, but among types of rules 
perceived, as in the case of Zambia. However, very few instances of ends paternalism or 
autonomy infringement are found overall. The overwhelming evidence among the case studies of 
Diagram 5.1: Perceived conditionality and the Normative Spectrum 
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Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe demonstrates that recipients continue to remain autonomous in 
their decision making, regardless of rule perception. Thus, perceived conditionality, when it does 
not lead to behavioral change, is not as morally objectionable as hard conditionality. If the 
quantitative analysis in Chapter Four had shown a large shift in spending behavior by recipients 
who perceived certain rules, the normative judgement on perceived conditionality in these cases 
would necessarily be different. By definition, however, perceptions are context-dependent. And 
in this case, the evidence shows that there exists moral reason to favor softer forms of 
conditionality over harder forms.  
The question remaining is whether conditions still matter if perceived but not acted upon. 
If people perceive conditions, is there a moral obligation to honor those perceptions, or does the 
obligation exist only when perceptions are driving behavioral change? While it is outside the 
scope of this thesis to answer that question, future research by both economists and ethicists 
should take it into consideration.  
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In Chapter Four, the following research questions were explored: In unconditional cash 
transfer programs in Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, 
• Do beneficiaries’ perceptions align with the actual rules of the program? 
• How do beneficiaries’ perceptions of program rules shape their behavior and therefore, 
the impact of the program? 
Regarding the first question, the evidence shows that beneficiaries’ perceptions of rules 
do not fully align with the three programs, which were created to be unconditional. Perceived 
conditionality existed. In Malawi, 74.6% of recipients perceived rules, and in Zambia 82.9%. 
Zimbabwe was the only country in which the majority of respondents did not perceive rules. In 
Zimbabwe, 37.4% believed the HSCT program to be conditional, while another 25.4% were 
unsure. In total, more recipients in Zimbabwe were confused than not, but the sample for which 
this thesis analyzed spending behavior is limited to the third which definitely perceived a rule. 
Not only does perceived conditionality exist at high rates in all three countries, most 
beneficiaries believe they will get kicked out of the program for noncompliance.  
Despite the high rates of confusion about the programs’ “rules” and belief in their 
enforcement, perceived conditionality did not lead to changed behavior in any country. The null 
hypothesis was that for a given expenditure category, households spend the same amount on it, 
regardless of whether they perceived the program to have a rule pertaining to that category. The 
alternative hypothesis was that households that perceived a rule for a given category spend more 
money on that category. This thesis must fail to reject the null hypothesis. The overwhelming 
pattern across all three countries was that perception of rules made little to no difference in how 
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recipients spent their money. The main implication of these findings is that these nominally 
unconditional programs in Southern Africa are operating as functionally unconditional. Since the 
programs were designed to be unconditional on the whole (regardless of whether nudges are 
present), it is a good sign that recipients seem to retain autonomy over their expenditures. 
However, confusion is confusion, and should not be disregarded simply because it doesn’t 
correlate to different spending habits. It is still best practice for program administrators to aim for 
maximum clarity about what each CT program does and does not require.  
The discrepancy between the existence of perceived conditionality and the lack of 
behavioral changed caused by it cannot be explained by the data presented in this thesis and 
provides a good opportunity for further research. However, this thesis can suggest a few potential 
explanations to the question of why a beneficiary would not act upon a rule they perceived. First, 
there may be cultural implications surrounding rule-following norms. While in the United States, 
welfare programs are enforced through highly bureaucratic processes and therefore there may be 
a greater incentive to comply with a program’s rules, the context may be different in other 
countries. Perhaps, beneficiaries perceived rules but did not feel the need to follow them. 
Another explanation is that beneficiaries did not have the means to act upon the rules they 
perceived. The transfer amounts in all three programs studied in this thesis are low, and 
beneficiaries are ultra-poor. It could be that beneficiaries spent money on the essential items they 
needed to survive and did not have enough left over to spend on items in “rule categories” in 
ways that would show up as statistically significant. If the transfer amount were larger, perhaps 
some of the results that were statistically significant and practically insignificant would have 
been amplified to a level that was also practically significant. This question of why perceived 
conditionality did not translate to changed behavior has an ethical component as well. If rule-
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perceiving beneficiaries were experiencing anxiety about their inability to comply with rules they 
perceive due to financial constraints, then the perceived conditionality would be acting as an 
additional burden on an already vulnerable population. However, in the cases studied in this 
thesis, more information is needed to make a normative judgement.   
 Future research should bear in mind the types of households that are more likely to 
perceive conditionality. In all three countries, patterns emerged showing certain demographic 
types of households to be more susceptible to perceiving a rule. Across the board, larger 
households with younger household heads and more children were more likely to perceive rules. 
The household head’s schooling also affected their likelihood of perceiving a rule; in Malawi, 
investment rule-perceivers were more likely to be literate; in Zambia, education-rule perceivers 
were less likely to have ever attended school; in Zimbabwe, rule-perceivers in general were more 
likely to have ever attended school. It seems that recipients with more children (and therefore 
larger households, or vice versa) and household heads who are younger were most susceptible to 
perceiving conditions in programs that otherwise operate as functionally unconditional. In all 
three countries, there were also geographic disparities to rule perception, suggesting that there 
was district-specific messaging that as confusing people about rules but not necessarily 
originating at the national level of the program. Although the endline years in this analysis are 
2013 (Zambia), 2015 (Malawi), and 2017 (Zimbabwe), and the district-specific susceptibility to 
rule perception could have changed since then, it would still be worthwhile for program 
administrators in Malawi and Zambia to monitor any differences in rule confusion between 
districts. These programs are national and should be experienced as similarly as possible in each 
location.  
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Limitations 
  The study designs in Malawi and Zambia were both RCTs, the “gold standard” of 
quantitative research design. The research design in Zimbabwe did not benefit from the internal 
validity of an RCT, but it had a strong comparison group nonetheless.  
 This analysis selected outcome variables that matched most closely to the perceived 
rules, but such matching cannot be perfect. For example, while a given rule may be “adequate 
food and nutrition for children,” the outcome of interest is per capita food expenditures, which 
includes adults in the household, as well as children. This imperfect matching could lead to 
underestimated results. Furthermore, some potential rule categories, such as health, were 
eliminated due to lack of available data and extremely low rates of perception. In Zambia, the 
rate of exclusion for rule instances was 18.4%, which may have had an impact on the results of 
this study. In Zimbabwe, the “food rule” was excluded due to lack of related outcome data, 
despite it being the second most common rule perceived, at 19.6% of total rule instances. 
Overall, 28.3% of rule instances in Zimbabwe were excluded. Although that relatively high rate 
of exclusion may have had an impact on the results, it is important to note that only about a third 
of recipients in Zimbabwe perceived any rule, so the effects not captured by this analysis would 
be unlikely to change the narrative for the HSCT overall, since rule-perceivers were already in 
the minority. 
It is likely that the analysis in this thesis is limited due to its lack of qualitative data to 
supplement the survey questions that asked about rule perception. It may be that “perceptions” 
are too nuanced to be captured well by quantitative methods. Continued research that employs 
qualitative interview methods, directly asking recipients about their administrative experiences 
with CT programs, is strongly recommended.  
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The ethical analysis in this thesis employed the WSP and PTP frameworks that were 
developed in a North American context to analyze U.S.-based welfare programs. These 
frameworks were not developed for non-Western or developing country contexts, where cultural 
norms around rules and the structure of welfare state bureaucracies may differ. The WSP and 
PTP frameworks are also best applied to welfare programs that target individuals, rather than 
households. The normative analysis and conclusions presented in this thesis may be limited by 
the lack of an existing ethical framework that fits the SSA context more closely.  
 It is an inherent flaw that RCTs have weak external validity, rarely generalizable beyond 
their specific context. The flipside to that weak external validity, however, is strong internal 
validity such that the results presented can be trusted. Since this thesis focused on three countries 
in Southern Africa, the external validity beyond that region is somewhat limited. However, this 
research adds to existing research on Lesotho’s Child Grant Programme, also a UCT in Southern 
Africa, and thus deeply strengthens the regional knowledge base about the operations of UCTs. 
Since the empirical results of this thesis were mostly null and cannot be generalized beyond 
Southern Africa, the implication is not that other UCT programs are operating as unconditional. 
It is still plausible that in another context, a perceived condition may influence spending 
behavior. Other CT programs in other countries must be analyzed separately.  
Furthermore, this thesis partly addresses the concern of generalizability by its mixed 
methods and inclusion of a normative analysis. While the normative conclusions specific to each 
of the countries as case studies cannot be generalized, the framework used can be applied to cash 
transfer programs around the world. The Normative Spectrum of Conditionality developed by 
this thesis is a novel contribution to the understudied intersection of economics and applied 
ethics. It may be applied to other CT programs and adjusted as necessary; more evidence will 
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refine it into a more accurate diagram. It would be especially beneficial for evaluators of other 
UCTs to consider the possibility of perceived conditionality. If cases exist where perceptions do, 




 Overall, perceived conditionality existed at high rates in all three countries. Perception of 
rules did not lead to changed behaviors, demonstrating that these programs were operating as 
unconditional. However, certain types of recipients were more likely to be confused about the 
“rules” than others. Households that perceived a rule in any country tended to be larger with 
more children and a younger household head.  
With mostly null findings on behaviors, this thesis recommends, for the most part, a 
continuation of the status quo in CT policy in Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. However, there 
are two notable exceptions, which are related to one another. First, due to the high prevalence of 
rule perception in each country, greater clarity and transparency about “rules” (or the absence 
thereof) is necessary. This thesis did not have access to more specific data on where the lack of 
clarity and muddled messaging about program rules originated and thus cannot provide more 
specific recommendations. Second, policymakers must not categorize a cash transfer program as 
broadly and only “conditional” or “unconditional” if the program truly operates in the middle of 
that spectrum. It is difficult for program administrators on the ground to be transparent about 
program rules if policymakers have categorized those programs on a binary that does not exist. 
Categorization of CT programs must be more nuanced moving forward.  
Given the case of Malawi, where the implementing Ministry intends to promote 
education-related expenditures, and anecdotal evidence shows existence of strong messaging by 
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local social workers to further promote this goal, the Malawian government may also explore the 
efficacy of a “labeled cash transfer” program design, as in Morocco (Benhassine et al., 2015). 
From anecdotal evidence, it seems that the name of a CT program acts somewhat as a label. 
Program administrators should be transparent in the delineation between a program’s names and 
its requirements.  
Most evaluations of cash transfer programs neglect to ask recipients directly about their 
experience with the administrative side of the program. Researchers should follow the Transfer 
Project’s lead in asking respondents about their perception of rules (among other administrative 
experiences) in an “operations module” that’s added to the household survey. Qualitative, 
interview-based research would be beneficial in conjunction with more ubiquitous use of an 
“operations module” that asks about rule perception. Although perceived conditionality did not 
lead to changed behavior in Malawi, Zambia, or Zimbabwe, it has not been tested outside 
Southern Africa. Through asking beneficiaries about their perceptions of program rules, future 
research should analyze whether perceived conditionality exists in other programs and whether it 
leads to changed behavior.  
Beyond the presence and effect of perceived conditionality, this thesis has generated 
other valuable questions for future research. First, it is necessary to understand why households 
were confused about the programs’ conditionality and why certain types of households were 
more likely to perceive rules than others. In conjunction, the ethical implications of any 
demographic susceptibility to rule perception should be considered. If, in other countries, more 
vulnerable demographics are more likely to perceive rules, there may be moral implications. The 
Normative Spectrum of Conditionality should be applied to other programs so that the relative 
positioning of normative and paternalistic categories can be refined. This thesis has also shown 
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that there is a hole in ethics literature regarding normative principles for testing paternalism in 
welfare state programs outside of North America. The question that has driven this research and 
that remains to be explored further is: How can economists and ethicists work together to better 
understand the role of recipients’ perceptions in social protection policies like cash transfer 
programs? 
This thesis explored three cash transfer programs quantitatively and through the 
application of a normative framework. There has been little prior research that focuses on the 
administrative side of cash transfer programs, so the contribution of this thesis to that growing 
field is important. More research should be done to better understand cash transfer programs 
from this operational angle. Perceived conditionality may not have led to significantly different 
spending behavior in Malawi, Zambia or Zimbabwe, but it did have an effect: cash transfer 
recipients were confused. And the people who were most likely to be confused were members of 
larger families with more children, a somewhat vulnerable demographic. Cash transfer programs 
are designed to help these vulnerable demographics the most. If they are receiving different 
messages, it is imperative that program administrators understand why that is and how it can be 
addressed. This thesis has unearthed an important area of research on which economists and 
ethicists may collaborate.  
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Figure 1a: Malawi 2014 questionnaire, Operations module 
 
Figure 1b: Zambia 2013 questionnaire, Operations module 
 
Figure 1c: Zimbabwe 2014 questionnaire, Operations module 
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Appendix B: The Spectrum of Conditionality 
 
